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Abstract
In the first essay, I build a heterogeneous agent model of housing default to study
how the effectiveness of macroprudential policies changes under different income and
house price specifications. When calibrated to match the observed default choices of
households during the financial crisis, the model has clear implications for the kind of
macroprudential policies that will be more effective in different circumstances. When
income shocks are large, restrictions on the loan-to-value ratio are more effective in
reducing defaults, while when house price shocks are large, the default rate is more
responsive to changes in payment-to-income limits. These results are an implication,
filtered through the model, of the well-known double trigger fact: In the Great Reces-
sion, defaulting households tended to be those who were both seriously underwater
and had experienced a substantial shock to income.
In the second essay, I study whether monetary policy has been less effective since
the global financial crisis because of deteriorating household balance sheets. The
paper examine the question using household data from the United States. It com-
pares the responsiveness of household consumption to monetary policy shocks in the
ii
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pre- and post-crisis periods, relating changes in monetary transmission to changes in
household indebtedness and liquidity. The results show that the responsiveness of
household consumption has diminished since the crisis. However, household balance
sheets are not the culprit. More indebted and less liquid households are the most
responsive to monetary policy, and their share in the population grew.
In the third essay, I introduce new methods for efficiently solving dynamic opti-
mization problems with both discrete and continuous choices (DC models). These
methods extend the Endogenous Gridpoint Method (EGM) by including exogenous
outcome probabilities, search frictions, and taste shocks to ‘concavify’ the value func-
tion of the optimization problem. Compared to existing extensions of the EGM for
DC models, the methods introduced in this paper have the added advantage of not
only providing greater smoothness, but also rationalizing the smoothness into the
agent’s choice problem.
Keywords: Macroprudential, Default, Heterogeneous Agents, Housing, Household
Debt, Monetary Policy, Discrete-Continuous Choice
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Chapter 1
Macroprudential Policies in a
Heterogeneous Agent Model of
Housing Default
1.1 Introduction
In the wake of the housing crisis of 2007-08, several countries have started imple-
menting a variety of macroprudential policies to mitigate systemic risks arising from
the housing sector (Lim et al. (2011), Claessens and Kodres (2014))1. During the
crisis, these risks culminated in the form of higher defaults that had the potential of
bringing down the entire financial system (Blinder (2013)). Consequently, a growing
1IMF (2018), Mitra (2016), and Darbar and Wu (2015) provide an overview of the macropruden-
tial policies being used by different countries.
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number of countries have mandated their central banks, or other regulatory author-
ities, to design and implement macroprudential policies. However, in spite of their
increasing popularity, there is very limited quantitative theory to back the choice of
macroprudential policies. This paper’s contribution towards filling this gap in the
literature is twofold. Firstly, it builds a structural heterogeneous agent model with
micro-foundations that can be used to study the outcomes of implementing different
macroprudential policies. Secondly, the paper provides analytical results on how the
effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing defaults changes under different
income and house price specifications.
For policymakers to design effective macroprudential policies, it is imperative
to have a good understanding of how these policies perform under different income
and house price specifications. Depending on the kind of macroprudential policy
in place, not only do income and house prices play a central role in determining a
household’s borrowing decision, they also have an impact on a household’s default
decision. The macroprudential policies studied in this paper are the loan-to-value
(LTV) and payment-to-income (PTI) rules. Both these rules are the predominant
macroprudential policies employed by countries to manage overall housing credit in
the economy (IMF et al. (2016)); however, each rule operates through different chan-
nels (Greenwald (2018)). An LTV rule sets minimum requirements on down payments
that depend on the prevalent house prices. In contrast, a PTI rule limits borrowing
based on the burden that mortgage payments put on a household’s income level.
2
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This paper finds that both the degree of income heterogeneity and house price
fluctuations play a non-trivial role in determining the effectiveness of macropruden-
tial policies in reducing defaults. When the size of income shocks increases, the
effectiveness of an LTV rule in filtering out households with the highest ex-post prob-
ability of default increases. Defaulting households in the model are the ones who are
not just seriously underwater, but who also experience a substantial shock to their
income. Under an LTV rule, the default risks primarily arise from low income house-
holds, who get access to large mortgage balances by meeting the LTV requirement,
but the high debt burden makes them susceptible to a bad income and house price
shock. Under this household behavior, when the size of income shocks is large, the
effectiveness of an LTV rule in reducing the default rate increases. This is because
an LTV rule sets minimum downpayment requirements, which become increasingly
difficult for low-income households to meet when the size of income shocks is large.
The households who can afford the downpayment and become homeowners are better
poised to absorb shocks to both their income and house prices.
If instead of the income shocks, house price shocks are large, the default rate is
more responsive to changes in PTI limits. Under a PTI rule, the default risks primarily
arise from high income households who get access to large mortgage balances by
meeting the PTI requirement, but are subsequently hit with a bad income shock. A
PTI rule operates by limiting the debt burden that periodic mortgage payments put
on a household’s income. This means that when the size of the house price shocks is
3
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large, for a given income level, a household cannot borrow more than what they would
in the baseline. However, they have to put up a larger downpayment if the prices are
above average and vice versa. Since under a PTI rule the main risks arise from high
income households levering up very high when houses are expensive, a tightening of
credit conditions is more effective at reducing defaults by requiring these high risk
households to build larger equity buffers.
The key to matching the observed default decisions is the model’s ability to re-
produce the well-known double trigger fact, i.e. in the Great Recession, defaulting
households tended to be those who were both seriously underwater and had experi-
enced a substantial shock to income (Bhutta et al. (2010)). The model features that
produce these outcomes are built into the micro foundations of homeowners. For
homeowners, default is costly. Not only do defaulters face a utility cost upon default-
ing, they are also forced out of the housing market for the remainder of their life. In
addition, staying a homeowner is appealing to households for multiple reasons. An
owner-occupied house provides households higher utility compared to the utility they
derive from rental housing. Since households face uninsurable income risk and there
is no unsecured borrowing, owner-occupied housing also smoothes a household’s hous-
ing consumption. Moreover, owned houses are assets that have a potential for capital
gains. These factors combined prevent a household from defaulting, even when they
are underwater.
While the micro foundations of homeowners determine the characteristics of house-
4
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holds with the highest likelihood of default, the micro foundations of renters, in
conjunction with the macroprudential policies, determine the characteristics of house-
holds who become homeowners. Under different income and house price specifications,
macroprudential policies differ from each other in the distribution of homeowners that
they filter through into the housing market. These homeowners are consequently ex-
posed to a varying degree of default risks, depending on the mortgage choices they
made, the amount of liquid assets they have, and their income level. Renters who
intend to buy a house have access to a multitude of long-term mortgages; however,
macroprudential policies limit the size of the maximum mortgage balance. With an
LTV rule, only the house prices determine the mortgage limit and with a PTI rule,
the income level also becomes relevant.
In order to accurately solve for the housing decision rules in a computationally
feasible manner, this paper also introduces a new modeling technique for solving
optimization problems with both discrete and continuous choices (DC models). Since
the housing tenure is a discrete state variable, and liquid resources and mortgage
balance are continuous state variables, the model in this paper is a DC model. DC
models are highly non-linear and the accuracy of the solution can depend on the
density of the grid space on which the model is solved. The modeling technique, which
relies on endogenizing housing search effort, minimizes the computational burden
arising from the non-linearities in DC models. This allows for a dense grid to be set
in regions of the state space with the highest degree of non-linearity, which is essential
5
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for accurately solving the homeowners’ default and selling decisions. Another positive
outcome of the technique is that it allows the model to capture the buyers’ and sellers’
time-on-market. This is because the housing search effort that households make is
endogenously determined by the additional value that they get from switching their
housing tenure.
The analysis in this paper is partial equilibrium in nature. Literature uses pe-
cuniary externalities that arise from financial frictions (Bianchi (2011), Davila and
Korinek (2018)) to rationalize limits on borrowing. This paper, on the other hand,
sets the utility cost from default exogenously and assumes that the macroprudential
policymaker’s goal is to reduce the default rate. The policymaker can achieve this
goal by tightening credit conditions through various macroprudential policies. The
simplifying assumptions provide tractability, which leads to very clear implications
for the effectiveness of macroprudential policies under various income and house price
specifications. In building these insights, this is also the first study to highlight in a
structural heterogeneous agent setting the importance of income heterogeneity and
house prices in determining the effective of macroprudential policies. Calibrated to
micro-level data, the model replicates aggregate household default and homeown-
ership rates very well. This gives the model solid foundations upon which a more




Due to the lack of harmonized data on defaults and limited time-series data on the
outcomes of macroprudential policies, the empirical literature has found mixed results
on the performance of macroprudential policies. While some studies find LTV and
PTI rules to be effective macroprudential tools, others find the opposite or mixed
results. Carreras et al. (2018), Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018), Cerutti et al.
(2017) use cross-country evidence to find that macroprudential policies have been
effective in containing risks arising from rising housing credit and house prices. In
contrast, Ono et al. (2016), using real estate registry data in Japan, find that caps
on high LTV ratios are ineffective macroprudential tools in containing risks. Kuttner
and Shim (2016), using data from 57 countries, find that PTI rules are effective
macroprudential tools, but LTV rules are less effective in times of growing asset
values. Adrian and Liang (2018) also note the mixed results for the effectiveness of
these tools.
This paper is related to a growing literature that builds structural models of
housing with micro foundations. Some of the main distinctive features of the model
are that the mortgage contracts are long-term debt contracts and have an option to
default. Berger et al. (2018) and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) construct heteroge-
neous agent housing models to study household responses to changes in house prices
and credit conditions, respectively. Both these studies, however, do not have a default
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option. Guren et al. (2018) also construct a housing model with long-term mortgages
and an option to default to study the housing wealth effect, but the utility cost
from default in their model is set so high that the households never actually default.
It is also important for mortgages to be long-term contracts, unlike the short-term
contracts in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017). This is because short-term mortgage
contracts can lead to forced deleveraging in response to short-run fluctuations in
house price, which makes it hard for the model to match the observed household
behavior.
An important feature of this paper is that it models the implications of house-
hold heterogeneity for contract selection. Household characteristics, like wealth and
income, have implications for not just contract selection, but also the pool of risky
borrowers. A closely related paper to this one is Campbell and Cocco (2015), which
constructs a heterogeneous agent model to study the effect of differences in LTV and
loan-to-income on households’ foreclosure decisions. However, they do not consider
the implications of household heterogeneity for contract selection. Similarly, Ganong
and Noel (2018) construct a partial equilibrium life-cycle model with housing to study
whether a borrower’s short-term constrains govern their response to long-term obli-
gations. Households in their model; however, start off as homeowners with a fixed
amount of mortgage balance. Greenwald (2018) also builds a general equilibrium
model of housing and uses it to study the performance of LTV and PTI rules. The
model in that paper though is a representative agent model, without an option to de-
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fault. Our experience through the housing crisis has shown that representative agent
models provide us with a narrow understanding of the risks that could be brewing due
to the behavior of households on the tail ends of the income and wealth distribution.
This paper is closely related and complementary to Kaplan et al. (2017) and Gar-
riga and Hedlund (2018). Both these papers are general equilibrium models of housing
that are used to study the boom-bust cycle during the housing crisis. Kaplan et al.
(2017) focus on the role played by households’ expectations during the boom-bust
episode. Garriga and Hedlund (2018), on the other hand, study how arrangements in
the mortgage market impact the dynamics of the housing boom-bust episode and the
economy. Garriga and Hedlund (2018) also study the implications of macroprudential
policies on the boom-bust cycle. This study, although partial equilibrium in nature,
complements these two studies by providing new insights into how heterogeneity of
households could impact the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing de-
fault. Moreover, the qualitative results are more broadly applicable, not just to the
boom-bust cycle.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the
institutional background that provides the guidelines for building a model of housing
default. Section 1.3 describes the key components of the model. Section 1.4 high-
lights the computational innovations made to solve discrete-continuous choice models
efficiently. Section 1.5 outlines the calibration and model fit. Section 1.6 discusses
the housing decision rules. Section 1.7 analyzes the performance of alternative macro-
9
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prudential policies under different income and house price specifications. Section 1.8
concludes. The appendix contains the detailed housing problem and describes the
perfect foresight solution.
1.2 Background
This section highlights some of the key features of the housing market and provides
insights into the behavior of homeowners during the housing crisis. These insights are
used to build the model. This section also discusses the institutional arrangements
that could give rise to different income and house price specifications.
The housing crisis of 2007-08 impacted different regions within the US with a
varying degree of intensity (Holly et al. (2010)). Some regions, such as California
and Florida, experienced high house price volatility, while others regions, such as
Indiana and Montana, did not. These diverse behaviors of house prices were even
more pronounced on an international scale (Figure 1.1a). In countries like the US,
the UK, and Spain, house prices experienced large swings around 2007. In contrast,
in other countries, like Japan and Germany, house prices have been relatively stable
over the last two decades. The countries that saw large swings in house prices also
witnessed increased default rates. Just looking at the house price dynamics, though,




A boom-bust in house prices alone is not enough to explain the increase in default
rates that was observed during the crisis. High leverage is also needed to drive
foreclosures in the housing markets when house prices fall (Mian and Sufi (2018),
Mian et al. (2017b)). If a household is not highly levered, they can always sell their
house rather than default. As households observe a rise in house prices, extrapolated
expectations (Bordalo et al. (2018)) lead them to believe that house prices would
rise even further. This means that the expected capital gains from homeownership
increases, which results in a higher demand for houses. Since houses are expensive,
households take up mortgages to buy a house. Eventually, when house prices fall, the
highly levered households default. These features can be seen in Figure 1.1b, which
shows that a drop in house prices under elevated levels of leverage lead to a rise
in foreclosure rates. The foreclosure rates fall when leverage recedes or when house
prices begin to rise.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that being underwater is not a sufficient
condition for households to default, they also need to be hit with a bad income shock
(Foote et al. (2008), Herkenhoff (2012)). This is referred to as the “double-trigger”
that is needed for households to default. Bhutta et al. (2010), using mortgage data
for households who purchased homes in 4 different states in 2006, find that 80% of
households who default in their sample, default because of negative equity combined
with a bad income shock. Thus, income heterogeneity is an essential component that
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(b) US house prices, debt burden, and fore-
closures.
Figure 1.1: The left panel shows the house price variation across different countries
(series indexed to 100 in 2003). The right panel shows that during the crisis, high
leverage and falling house prices led to an increase in housing foreclosure (series
indexed to 100 in 2003).
high degree of heterogeneity in income variability across different countries (Acemoglu
(1997)). A country with poor social insurance mechanisms in place would lead to a
high degree of income heterogeneity and vice versa. Amongst the developed world,
the US would correspond to a country with a high degree of income heterogeneity,
compared to a country like Denmark, which has a low degree of income heterogeneity.
This study focuses on LTV and PTI rules as alternative macroprudential policies.
These are two of the main macroprudential policies that are observed in countries
around the world and they hold particular relevance for the US. In order to reform
the financial regulation in the US, the Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which
12
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became effective in 2010. The law instituted “Ability-to-Repay (ATR)” rules, which
were rules that required mortgage lenders to make a good-faith effort to determine
that the borrower was likely to be able to pay back the loan. Operationally, the ATR
rules imposed limits on loan-to-value (LTV) and payments-to-income (PTI), and also
included other measures to reduce the likelihood of a borrower defaulting.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Households
A home purchase makes up the biggest investment for most households. This is in
spite of the fact that a house is an illiquid asset due to both the transaction and search
costs associated with buying or selling a house. In addition, house prices, particularly
at the individual level, can be highly volatile (Case and Shiller (1989)) and unlike most
financial assets, this idiosyncratic risk cannot be diversified, as a house is indivisible.
High house price volatility, combined with illiquidity, implies that individual houses
as an investment are not very attractive (Piazzesi and Schneider (2016)). Yet, roughly
two-thirds of households in the US are homeowners. This can be explained by certain
features of an owner-occupied house that make it an appealing asset. Owner-occupied
housing provides housing services in excess of those provided by a rental house of
similar size and, as an asset, it has the potential of capital gains. For households
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concerned about income risk, homeownership also allows households to smooth their
housing consumption. These features are incorporated into the model.
In the model, a household’s housing tenure can take up four different states:
renters, homeowners, tenants, and defaulters. Households in each tenure state derive
utility from consuming non-durable/non-housing consumption goods, ct, and housing
services, st. The aggregate consumption bundle has a Cobb-Douglas form, c̃t =
cαt s
1−α
t . This form is supported by a variety of micro-oriented studies (Berger et al.







1− ρ . (1.1)
Households start each period with liquid assets, mt. Renters, in addition to non-
housing consumption, also pay for rental services. Rental services can be adjusted
costlessly and are assumed to have the same unit cost as a unit of non-housing con-
sumption. This simplifying assumption does not affect our main results, since during
most of the pre-crisis years the house price-to-rent ratio has primarily been driven by
variations in house prices and rental prices have roughly grown at the same pace as
the prices of non-durable consumption goods. Each period, renters decide whether
they will stay as renters in the next period (rr) or if they will become homeowners
(rh). If they choose to become homeowners in the next period, the house must be
purchased in the current period; however, it is only made available to the household
in the next period. At the time of purchase, buyers chooses how much mortgage debt,
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bt, to take up and, in the baseline model, face a loan-to-value (LTV), or equivalently,
a downpayment constraint. Homebuyers also incur lump-sum transaction costs κp.
Homeowners, in contrast to renters, only pay for non-durable/non-housing con-
sumption and derive housing services that are proportional to the size of the house,
ht:
st = ζht. (1.2)
Homeowners in each period decide whether they will stay as homeowners in the next
period (hh), sell their house and become tenants in the next period (ht), or default on
their mortgage (hd). The reason homeowners who sell their house are called tenants
and not renters is because tenancy is a self-absorbing state. Once homeowners leave
the housing market, they are not allowed to buy a house again. Similar to tenancy,
defaulting is also a self-absorbing state. This assumption is made to simplify the
numerical solution (explained in section 1.4). The simplifying assumption, however,
does not significantly affect the relevant outcomes of the model, since the average
duration of a household’s life is 30 years and they are replaced by renters who have
the option to become homeowners.
Houses for purchase are only available in one size, h, and their depreciation is offset
by maintenance costs, δm, which are paid by homeowners who decide to continue being
homeowners (hh). Continuing homeowners also have to make mortgage payments,
which are determined by the size of their mortgage balance at the beginning of the
period. Households who sell the house pay off their mortgage balance and receive
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proceeds from the sale of the house. Even though the household receives the proceeds
from the sale of the house in the current period, the house is only made unavailable
in the next period. While selling the house, the household also incurs lump-sum
transaction cost κs. In case the household defaults, they walk away from the house
and the mortgage balance, but they incur a utility cost, χ, in the period in which
they default. This cost captures the non-financial costs that inhibit a household from
defaulting. As noted earlier, if a homeowner decides to discontinue being a homeowner
(ht or hd), they are not allowed to participate in the housing market again in the
future.
There are also search frictions in the housing market, which means that renters
and homeowners stay in their original housing tenure state, unless they exert an effort
to switch the state. Search effort entails convex utility costs and the amount of effort
exerted depends on the excess utility flow that the household would receive from
successfully making the switch.
Denoting the discount factor by β and the probability of survival by  D , households








The infinite horizon problem can also be thought of as a finite horizon problem in
which the agents have perfect altruism towards their descendants. In this context,
the aggregate utility is called the dynastic utility. The choice of an infinite horizon
problem means that the model abstracting away from its life-cycle features, which
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are studied in detail by Berger et al. (2018), Oswald et al. (2017), Wong (2017), and
Yao et al. (2015), among others. The detailed households’ problem in Bellman form
is outlined in Appendix 1.9.1.
1.3.2 Income and House Prices
Each period, households also face an idiosyncratic risk of getting unemployed. While
unemployed, households receive unemployment benefits ν. The transition matrix for













Conditional on being employed, households face uninsurable income risk. Income, Yi,t,
follows a process with both a persistent and a transitory component. The process is
specified as
Yi,t = exp {ypi,t + θi,t}, (1.5)
ypi,t = γyy
p
i,t−1 + ψi,t, (1.6)
where γy is the persistence parameter of the persistent component of income, and ψi,t
and θi,t represent the persistent and transitory shocks to income, respectively. The
variances associated with these shocks are denoted by σ2ψ and σ
2
θ .
House prices, Pt, are assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process:
Pt = exp {pt}, (1.7)
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pt = γppt−1 + ξt, (1.8)
where γp governs the persistence of house prices and σ
2
ξ denotes the variance of the
house price shocks.
1.3.3 Financial Markets
Both renters and homeowners can deposit their liquid assets at banks at a fixed in-
terest rate r. Neither renters nor homeowners have access to short-term borrowing,
which means that their end of period liquid assets, at, cannot fall below 0. Home-
owners, however, have access to long-term mortgage debt at a fixed interest rate rm.
Unlike studies that have short term mortgage debt and forced deleveraging (Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2017), Berger et al. (2018)), households in this model are not forced
to delever in response to negative house price shocks. Mortgage balance follows a
constant geometric amortization schedule, with a half-life of 15 years (details in Ap-
pendix 1.9.4). A constant geometric amortization schedule, instead of a constant
amortization schedule, is used since the optimization problem is an infinite horizon
problem. Each period’s mortgage payments, as a function of the beginning-of-period








where n = 15 at the annual frequency.
At the time of purchase, households face an LTV constraint, which limits the
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maximum mortgage debt at origination, and is given by
bt ≤ ηLTV pth. (1.10)
An LTV constraint can equivalently be thought of as a downpayment constraint. The
minimum downpayment at the time of purchase is max {0, (1− ηLTV ) pth}.
The baseline model uses an LTV constraint; however, later in the paper it is replace
by a payment-to-income, or PTI, constraint. The PTI constraint imposes a borrowing
limit at the time of home purchase based on the debt burden that periodic mortgage
payments put on a household’s income. The burden is assessed using the household’s
persistent income in that period, rather than the total income. Lenders typically
adjust a loan applicant’s income for “special factors”, which can be interpreted as an
adjustment towards the persistent income (FannieMae (2018), FreddieMac (2016)).
The PTI constraint is given by
λ(bt+1) ≤ ηPTI .ypt (1.11)
1.3.4 Search frictions
Households have to exert search effort to change their housing tenure. This search
effort entails convex utility costs. Normalizing the search effort to equal the proba-
bility of a successful search, denote this normalized effort by εit and the utility cost
associated with the effort by σi(εit). For renters choosing to become homeowners,
denote the search effort and the utility cost associated with making that search effort
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by εht and σ
h(εht ), respectively. The value function and the consumption function for
the renter are given by:
V rt (mt, y
p
t , pt) = max
εht ∈[0,1]




t , pt) = (1− εht )crrt (mt, ypt , pt) + εht crht (mt, ypt , pt). (1.13)
The cost function σh associated with the renter’s search effort εht is specified as









where Sh is a smoothness parameter that captures the degree of frictions in the home
purchase market. This cost function implies that σh(0) = 0 and limεht →1 σ
h(εht ) = Sh.
The effort function associated with this cost function is given by
εht (mt, y
p





This implies that the degree of search effort exerted by the renters is a function of the
additional utility flow that the renter gets from successfully making the switch. The
greater the utility flow that a renter gets from becoming a homeowner, the greater
the effort they exert in the housing search market. Since effort is non-negative, when
the value of staying a renter exceeds the value of becoming a homeowner, the effort
that a renter exerts is zero.
Unlike renters, homeowners can switch their housing tenure into two states: they
can either sell their house and become tenants, or they can default. For better exposi-
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tion, the homeowner’s search problem is split into two sequential search problems. In
the first stage, the homeowner faces a choice between staying a homeowner or selling
the house. The search effort that a homeowner makes to sell the house, rather than
continue occupying it, is denoted by εtt. The utility cost, σ
t(εtt), associated with this
effort has the same functional form as the search cost function for the renter, but
here the search friction parameter is given by St. In the second stage of the search
problem for the homeowner, households have to choose between defaulting or facing
the search problem described in the first stage of housing search. The search effort is
denoted by εdt and the associate search cost and search friction parameter are denoted
by σd(εdt ) and Sd, respectively.
The value function and the consumption function for the homeowner are given by
V ht (mt, bt, ht, y
p





−σd(εdt ) + εdtV hdt (mt, bt, ht, ypt )
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The effort functions for the homeowners are given by:




















In the housing model outlined above, the beginning-of-period liquid assets mt and
mortgage balance bt are treated as continuous state variables. This makes it possi-
ble to use the Endogenous Gridpoint Method (EGM) (Carroll (2006)), which offers
greater computational efficiency compared to traditional root-finding solution meth-
ods. Using the EGM, one can feasibly construct a dense grid in the regions of the
state space where the degree of non-linearity is the highest. These are also the regions
where households typically switch their housing tenure states. Having a dense state
space in these regions is particularly important for accurately capturing the house-
holds’ default behavior. However, the default decision, like the decision to buy or sell
a house, is a discrete choice and in models with both discrete and continuous choices
(DC models), standard EGM can produce suboptimal solution points. These points
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need to be identified and removed from the final solution and this additional step
deteriorates the computational efficiency of the standard EGM.
To reduce the severity of this problem, Iskhakov et al. (2017) use exogenous taste
shocks to smooth out the marginal value functions in their DC problem. In contrast,
the model in this paper achieves the smoothness of the marginal value functions
through the endogenous housing search mechanism. In the context of housing, this is
more economically plausible compared to exogenous taste shocks. The search effort
gets endogenously determined by the severity of the kinks in the value function. This
makes it possible to smooth out the expected marginal value function enough that the
EGM does not produce any suboptimal points at all. Moreover, in contrast to taste
shocks, housing search captures a very significant feature of the housing market: the
time on market. In addition to the transaction costs, the time on market associated
with buying and selling a house is another feature of houses that makes them illiquid.
(Details of the computational methods used to solve the model are provided in
Appendix 1.9.5).
1.5 Calibration
Following Kaplan et al. (2017) and Garriga and Hedlund (2018) the model is cal-
ibrated to match cross-sectional features of the U.S. housing market prior to the
housing boom. The model is calibrated at an annual frequency to data from 1998,
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as it also aligns with a Survey of Consumer Finance release that year. Some of the
parameters are calibrated externally, while others are jointly calibrated internally to
match key housing data moments.
As is standard in the literature, the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ is set
to 2. In the default model estimated by Campbell and Cocco (2015), the lifespan
of a household is set at 20 years. However, in this model the average lifespan of a
household is set to 30 years. For the purpose of the modeling exercise in this paper,
a lifespan of 30 years is befitting, since 30 years is also the prevalent duration of a
mortgage. A lifespan of 30 years implies a survival probability of 0.975.
Following Krueger et al. (2016), the income process is calibrated using annual
PSID after-tax earnings data, after removing age, education, and time effects. This
yields estimates of 0.9695 for the persistence parameter γy, 0.0384 for σ
2
ψy and 0.0522
for σ2θ . The transition probabilities of unemployment are calibrated by convert-
ing Shimer (2005)’s quarterly estimates to annualized values. This leads to an
employment-to-unemployment transition probability, πe,u, of 0.1 and an unemployment-
to-employment transition probability, πu,e, of 0.99. Also following Shimer (2005), the
unemployment benefits, ν, are set to 40% of the average labor income. The housing
search parameters, Sh, St, and Sd are set to 0.25, 0.65, and 0.25, respectively. These
values provide appropriate smoothing of the expected marginal value functions in the
problem2.
2In the annual specification, these parameters do not result in time-on-market moments that
match the data well. A quarterly specification would be needed for that.
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The generic house size, h, is set to 3.4. This means that the house is 3.4 times
the mean labor income (Mitman et al. (2017)). The persistence of house prices, γp,
is set to 0.988 using the Case-Shiller house price index, and the standard deviation
of house prices is set to 0.162 following Campbell and Cocco (2015). The lump-sum
transaction costs at the time of purchase, κp, and sale, κs, of a house are set to 1%
of the mean house price. Houses are assumed to not depreciate as homeowners have
to incur maintenance costs that offset the depreciation rate. Following Kaplan et al.
(2017), these maintenance costs, κm, are set to 2% of the mean house price.
The risk-free interest rate r is set to 3%. The fixed mortgage rate rm is set
to 7%, using the average 30-year fixed rate mortgage in the US over 1998. In the
baseline model, the LTV limit ηLTV is set at 95%, which is 10 percentage points
higher than the average CLTV prior to the housing boom (UrbanInstitute (2017)).
Since homeowners in this model are not allowed cash-out refinancing, or to borrow
against their home equity, this adjustment is made to take into account the fact that
in reality, cash-out refinancing can lead to many cases of new mortgages with LTVs
greater than 100% (Mitman et al. (2017)). This baseline LTV limit falls between
the LTV limits of 90% set by Campbell and Cocco (2015) and 125% set by Mitman
et al. (2017). In the baseline model, the PTI constraint is non-binding, however,
in the alternate specification in which the LTV rule is replaced with a PTI rule,
ηPTI is set to 45%3, following the Seller/Servicer Guidelines provided by Freddie Mac
3This is almost equivalent to the PTI limit of 43% set under the Qualifying Mortgage condition




The remaining parameters of the model are calibrated jointly by targeting the
annual foreclosure rate, the homeownership rate, and the median LTV. The Simulated
Method of Moments (SMM) is used for this estimation exercise. Using the National
Delinquency Survey, the model targets an annual foreclosure rate of 1.6%. The U.S.
Census Bureau’s data for homeownership provides a target homeownership rate of
67.8%. For the median LTV, the 1998 SCF provides a target of 0.62. Table 1.2 shows
the resulting estimates for the discount factor, β, the share of non-housing services in
the aggregate consumption bundle, α, the housing services flow from owned housing,
ζ, and the default utility cost, χ. All these estimates are within the range of estimates
produced by various studies.
Table 1.3 shows that the model fits the key data moments quite well. The model
does a very good job of matching the average annual foreclosure rate, the homeown-
ership rate, and the median LTV. Matching the default rate so well is a result of the
micro-foundations of households and due to the solution technique employed, which
allows the model to capture the behavior of low wealth households very accurately.
Not only does the model generated foreclosure rate of 1.62% compare well with the
empirical estimate of 1.60%, it also fares better than Kaplan et al. (2017) model-
generated annual foreclosure rate of 0.4%. The model also does a fairly reasonable
job matching the untargeted moments such as the median net worth (liquid assets
+ house value - mortgage debt), relative to median after-tax income, and the mean
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Table 1.1: Model parameters (external calibration)
Preferences Description Value Source
ρ Coeff. of relative risk aversion 2 Standard in literature
 D Survival probability 0.975 30yrs lifespan
Income
γy Persistence of pers. income shock 0.9695 Krueger et al. (2016)
σ2ψ Var. of pers. income shock 0.0384 Krueger et al. (2016)
σ2θ Var. of trans. income shock 0.0522 Krueger et al. (2016)
πe,u Probability of unemployment 0.1 Shimer (2005)
πu,e Probability of re-employment 0.99 Shimer (2005)
ν Unemp. benefit (rel. to y) 0.4 Shimer (2005)
Housing
h House size (rel. to y) 3.4 Mitman et al. (2017)
γp Persistence house price shock 0.9880 Case-Shiller HPI
σ2ξ Var. of house price shock 0.0262 Campbell and Cocco (2015)
κp Purch. trans. cost (rel. to p) 0.01
κs Sale trans. cost (rel. to p) 0.01
κm Maint. cost (rel. to p) 0.02 Kaplan et al. (2017)
Sh Search param. for rh 0.25 Author’s calculations
St Search param. for ht 0.65 Author’s calculations
Sd Search param. for hd 0.25 Author’s calculations
Fin. conditions
r Risk-free rate 3% Av. 1yr Treasury
rm Mortgage rate 7% Av. 30yr FRM in 1998
ηLTV LTV limit 0.95 UrbanInstitute (2017)
ηPTI PTI limit 0.45 FreddieMac (2016)
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Table 1.2: Model parameters (joint calibration)
Variable Description Value
β Discount rate 0.975
α Share of non-housing 0.70
ζ Housing services from owned house 1.03
χ Default utility cost 0.65
Table 1.3: Model fit
Moment Data Model
Foreclosure rate (%) 1.60 1.62
Home ownership rate (%) 67.8 71.2
Median LTV 0.62 0.59
Median net worth (rel. to median after-tax income) 1.56 2.78
Median mortgage debt (rel. to median after-tax income) 2.14 2.62
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mortgage debt, relative to median after-tax income. The model partly produces a
higher median net worth compared to the data, because it generates a slightly higher
homeownership rate of 71.2% and a slightly lower median LTV of 0.59, compared to
the data.
1.6 Housing decisions
Before analyzing the effectiveness of different macroprudential policies under various
income and house price specifications, a discussion of the housing decision rules for
renters and homeowners in the model is necessary. Figure 1.2 shows the renter’s
converged housing decision rule under an LTV rule. On the y-axis, the zero-line
indicates the renter’s decision to stay as a renter. Above the zero-line, a higher value
indicates a larger mortgage balance at origination and below the zero-line indicates
a renter’s decision to buy a house without any mortgage debt. Since the subplots in
Fig 1.2 are made conditional on the house price levels, the y-axis normalized by the
price level would give the LTV level at mortgage origination.
Due to the way in which an LTV rule operates, a household’s borrowing limit is
entirely determined by the level of house prices. Under low house prices, households
have access to lower mortgage levels, regardless of their income, and vice versa. An
LTV limit is also equivalent to setting minimum requirements on downpayments that
depend on the price of the house. When house prices are low (Fig 1.2a), households
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need to accumulate fewer liquid assets to buy a house. However, low house prices
also limit the maximum available mortgage size at origination. In contrast, at higher
house price levels (Fig 1.2b), renters have access to higher levels of mortgage balance.
Households with higher liquid assets opt for lower mortgage balance at origination
and very rich households choose to buy a house by paying the full price, without any
mortgage.
Renters’ housing decisions also vary with the level of persistent income. For a given
level of house prices and liquid assets, low income homebuyers are levered at least
as high as the high income homebuyers, which makes them more vulnerable to bad
income or house price shocks. The LTV constraint implies that for a particular house
price level, regardless of the income level, all renters have access to similar mortgage
contracts. Since renters with low persistent income also have lower prospects of
future income, they choose to lever up as much as they can and buy a house to
smooth their housing consumption. Even at higher levels of liquid assets, low income
households choose to lever up more than high income households, for a given level of
liquid assets. This continues to hold even when house prices are high. High leverage,
however, makes households a lot more vulnerable to default risks.
Under a PTI rule, since borrowers are constrained by the burden that mortgage
payments put on their income, for a given price level, households with lower income
have access to lower mortgage balances and vice versa. The behavior of renters is
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(a) Homeowner’s housing decision under low in-
come and high prices.
High income and high prices






















(b) Homeowner’s housing decision under high
income and high prices.
Figure 1.4: Homeowner’s housing decision rule under high house prices. When house
prices are high, homeowners do not default. If their are liquidity constrained, they
sell their house and extract equity to relax their budget constraint.
holds default. Figure 1.4 shows the housing decision rule for low-income and high
income homeowners when house prices are high. These results have two main out-
comes. Firstly, when house prices are high, the housing decisions are unaffected by the
household’s income level. Secondly, when homeowners have ample liquid resources,
they choose to stay as homeowners. Homeowners sell their house if their liquid assets
are too low. These liquidity constrained households sell rather than default because
when house prices are high, homeowners have positive equity for the debt levels con-
sidered in this study. Thus, by selling their house, households can extract their equity
and relax their budget constraint.
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Low income and low prices






















(a) Homeowner’s housing decision under low in-
come and low prices.
High income and low prices






















(b) Homeowner’s housing decision under high
income and low prices.
Figure 1.5: Homeowner’s housing decision rule under low house prices. When house
prices are low, homeowners’ default if they are highly levered and liquidity con-
strained. Under these circumstances, their likelihood of default increases significantly
if they receive a bad income shock.
When house prices fall and the debt level is low, homeowners’ housing decision is
still not sensitive to the income level. However, when the debt level is high, the deci-
sions become highly sensitive to the income level. Fig 1.5 shows that when households
are not highly levered, at low levels of liquidity, they sell their house. This decision
does not change with the level of income. In contrast when debt level is high, under
low house prices, the likelihood of default increases significantly when the household
income is low. Fig. 1.5a shows that the range of liquid asset wealth along which
households default, spreads out when the income level is low. Thus, a homeowner
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defaults if (i) they are are underwater and (ii) they receive a negative income shock
that pushes their liquid assets very low. Moreover, the fewer the liquid resources
that a household has, the smaller is the magnitude of the bad income shock that is
needed to push the household below the threshold beyond which they default. This
is precisely the double-trigger fact that was observed during the Great Recession.
1.7 Effectiveness of macroprudential poli-
cies
The baseline income and house price processes are calibrated using the US data.
Varying the LTV limit changes the default rate in the economy. This exercise pro-
vides the baseline effectiveness of the LTV rule in changing the default rate. In the
counterfactuals, the size of the income and house prices are doubled by doubling the
variances of these processes, separately, and the LTV limit is varied. The differences
in the slopes of the default rate locus produced by this experiment transparently re-
veal how the effectiveness of an LTV rule changes as the size of the income and house
price shocks increases. A similar experiment is repeated by replacing the LTV rule
with a PTI rule to evaluate how the size of income and house price shocks affect the
performance of a PTI rule.
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1.7.1 Baseline performance of LTV rules
Although the focus of this study is defaults, this sub-section also evaluates how some
of the other major housing moments change as the LTV limit is varied. This is to
provide the reader with deeper insights into the functioning of the model. Figure 1.6
shows that a tightening of the LTV limit (i.e. moving left on the x-axis) leads to a
decline in the default rate. This is due to two main reasons. Firstly, a tightening
of the LTV limits reduces the overall leverage in the economy and consequently the
default rate as well. Secondly, since a reduction in the LTV limit is equivalent to
requiring a higher downpayment, a tightening of the LTV rule makes it increasingly
difficult for low income households to buy a house. These are households with the
highest likelihood of default, as shown in the homeowners’ decision rule in Fig 1.5a,
and filtering them out of the housing market reduces the default rate.
In the baseline setting, almost all the defaults are concentrated between the LTV
limit of 90% and 100%. This is primarily due to the fact that there is only a single-
sized house in the model and the households’ impatience factor, β, is homogenous.
The impatience factor influences the households’ borrowing and default decisions.
Since in this model it can only take up a single value, the calibration leads to an
estimate of β which generates a large density of households concentrated close to the
borrowing limit. These are also the households who are the most likely to default if
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Figure 1.6: Impact of varying the LTV limit on different housing moments.
sizes and heterogeneous βs would not only be able to match the distribution of LTV
much better, it would also expand the range of LTV limits over which households
default.
Although a tightening of credit conditions reduces the default rate, since houses
become less affordable, the homeownership rate declines in a monotonic manner as
well. Unlike the homeownership rate, the relationship between the LTV limit and
the net worth of households is non-monotonic. When households default, they lose
their home equity and, consequently, their net worth takes a hit. A tightening of
the LTV limit means that households now have to accumulate higher levels of liquid
assets to pay for the higher down-payment, before they can buy a house. As a result
of this, households have a larger equity share in their house. This means that they
have a larger capacity to absorb negative income and house price shocks, and their
likelihood of default falls. Tightening the LTV limit from a very loose level leads
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to an increase in the median net worth of households. This is due to both a lower
default rate and households accumulating greater liquid assets. A borrowing limit
that is too tight, however, can lead to excessive reduction in the homeownership rate,
which can lead to a negative impact on the households’ median net worth. Figure
1.6 illustrates this point. We can see that the median net worth of households as a
function of the LTV limit produces a hump shape. A tightening of the LTV limit,
from a very loose value of 100%, initially leads to an increase in the median net worth
of households; however, further tightening results in a decline in the median net worth
for the reasons outlined above. In the baseline calibration, the LTV limit of 95% is
in the region where a moderate tightening of the LTV limit leads to an increase in
the median net worth of households.
1.7.2 Performance of LTV rules under alternative
income and house price shocks
To study the performance of the LTV rule under larger income shocks, the variance of
persistent income, σ2ψ, is doubled. The blue line in Fig 1.7a plots the performance of
the LTV rule in this economy. Fig 1.7a shows that in an economy with larger income
shocks, the performance of an LTV rule in reducing the default rate increases. This
is demonstrated by the steeper slope of the default rate line under more volatile
income. To study the performance of the LTV rule under larger house price shocks,
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the variance of the house price shocks, σ2ξ , is doubled. The yellow line in Fig 1.7a
shows that when house price shocks are large, the effectiveness of an LTV rule in
reducing defaults declines, as demonstrated by the lower slope of the default rate
line.
Under an LTV rule, the default risks primarily arise from low income households,
who get access to large mortgage balances by meeting the LTV requirement, but are
subsequently hit with a bad house price shock. When income shocks are large, the
income distribution becomes wider, which means that low income households have
smaller incomes compared to low income households when the shock size is small.
Under these circumstances, a tightening of the LTV rule is more effective at filtering
out from the housing market households with the highest ex-post risk of defaulting.
This is because it is relatively harder for low income households to accumulate the
higher downpayment when income shocks are large. To put it differently, when in-
come shocks are large, it becomes easier for a tightening in the LTV rule to identify
and exclude from the housing market households who have the highest likelihood
of defaulting. Consequently, the effectiveness of the LTV rule in reducing defaults
improves.
When house price shocks are larger, the ability of a tightening in the LTV rule to
exclude high risk households worsens, demonstrated by the more moderate slope of
the yellow line in Fig 1.7a. This is because under large house price shocks, when house






























(b) Performance of PTI rule.
Figure 1.7: Effectiveness of LTV and PTI rules in reducing defaults under different
income and house price specifications.
access to much larger mortgage balances. Even though the rise in house prices is met
with a proportionate rise in the downpayment, the fact that households have access
to larger mortgages means that those households who do become homeowners have
a much higher debt burden. Compared to high income households, the debt burden
is higher for low income households who are able to meet the LTV requirement to
become homeowners. Consequently, if house prices drop, even a moderate shock
to income can lead them to default. Even though tightening of the LTV limit still
reduces the default rate, because homebuyers have to put in additional downpayment,
the reduction is more moderate under large house price shocks. The LTV rule does
not consider the debt burden that buying a house puts on households and, therefore,
cannot identify and exclude from the housing market the households who are able
to meet the downpayment requirement but are nonetheless highly burdened by the
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mortgage payments. In this model, an LTV rule in which ηLTV increases with the
size of the house prices could potentially minimize this weakness of the standard LTV
rule.
1.7.3 Performance of PTI rules
In this section, the LTV rule is replaced with a PTI rule. The dotted line in Fig 1.7b
shows that under the baseline income and house price specifications, a tightening of
credit conditions that is achieved by decreasing the PTI limit leads to a decline in
the default rate. Compared to when an LTV rule is operational, the results show
some salient differences under a PTI rule. Another thing to note is that since the
income distribution is discretized to finite points, for extremely lax PTI limits, all
households have access to the housing market without requiring any downpayment.
Unless the PTI limit is tightened aggressively, the default rate is unresponsive to the
credit conditions.
Under a PTI rule, the default risks primarily arise from high income households
who at the time of mortgage origination get access to large mortgage balances, but
are subsequently hit with a bad income shock. When the size of house price shocks is
large, the PTI rule becomes more effective at reducing defaults. This is demonstrated
by the steeper slope of the yellow line in Fig 1.7b. Under a PTI rule, to maintain the
debt burden for a given income level, households have to put up a larger downpayment
if house prices are above average and vice versa. Since with a PTI rule in place, the
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default risks primarily arise from high income households buying expensive houses,
when credit conditions are tightened, a PTI rule is more effective at forcing the high
risk households to build larger equity buffers. This translates to a higher effectiveness
of the PTI rule in reducing defaults when house prices shocks are large.
In contrast, the blue line in Fig 1.7b shows that when the size of income shocks
is increased by doubling the variance of the persistence income process, σ2ψ, the ef-
fectiveness of the PTI rule in reducing the default rates deteriorates. A negative
consequence of larger income shocks under a PTI rule is that now high income house-
holds have access to much larger mortgage balances, regardless of the price level, and
there is no explicit requirement for higher downpayments. Even though a tightening
of the PTI rule still reduces the defaults that could potentially arise from low income
households entering the housing market, it is unable to effectively filter out risky high
income households from the mortgage market. Consequently, a PTI rule’s effective-
ness in reducing the default rate deteriorates. In this model, a PTI rule in which ηPTI
increases with the size of the income level could potentially minimize this weakness
of the standard PTI rule.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper studies how the effectiveness of LTV and PTI rules in reducing defaults
changes under various income and house price specifications. The results suggest
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that policymakers, when designing macroprudential tools, must also consider the
household-level income and house price dynamics of the economy. In an economy with
large income shocks, an LTV rule serves as a more effective macroprudential tool in
reducing the default rates. In contrast, in an economy with large house price shocks, a
PTI rule fares better. A prevalent macroprudential policy, which is not considered in
this study, is the debt-to-income (DTI) rule. DTI rules are popular in the European
countries, which predominantly have adjustable rate mortgages. A study of whether
a DTI rule insulates better against interest rate shocks is left for future research. The
modeling framework introduced in this paper can also be extended to address more





In this section, I solve the problem of the different sub-types of households separately.
1.9.1.1 Note on state variables
Since this paper employs the endogenous gridpoint method in solving our model, a
distinction needs to be made between the pre-decision and post-decision state vari-
ables. I denote the pre-decision liquid assets by mt and the post-decision liquid assets
by at. For homeowner, there are 2 more state variables: the level of housing stock, ht,
and the mortgage balance, bt. Although there is no uncertainty involved in the dy-
namic equations linking these pre- and post-decision state variables, just for clarity of
thought, I will denote the post-decision housing stock (mortgage debt) variable, which
will also be the choice variables for new homeowners, by ht (bt), and the pre-decision
housing stock (mortgage debt) variable by ht (bt).
The dynamic equation for liquid assets is given by
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1, (1.20)




The dynamic equation for housing stock is given by
ht+1 = ht, (1.21)
where ht is a choice variable for new homeowners and thereafter it evolves according
to
ht = ht, (1.22)
unless the homeowner is moving out of the house (ht, hd), in which case ht = 0.
The dynamic equations for mortgage balance is given by
bt+1 = (1 + r
m)bt, (1.23)
where bt is a choice variable for new homeowners and thereafter it evolves according
to
bt = bt − λ(bt), (1.24)
where λ(bt) is the mortgage function that gives the mortgage payments for a given
beginning-of-period mortgage balance.
Before I proceed to solving the detailed problem, I must note that I will denote
the variables that are defined as a function of the end-of-period state variables using
a gothic font. That is, the end-of-period value function is denoted by v, and the





The intertemporal optimization problem for (rr), in Bellman form, is given by
V rrt (mt, y
p




Et{V rt+1(mt+1, ypt+1, pt+1)}
s.t.
at = mt − ct − st ≥ 0
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1
Defining total consumption expenditure, ĉt, as ĉt = ct + st and using the Cobb-
Douglas functional form for c̃t, the intratemporal optimality conditions imply that
ct = αĉt (1.25)
and






Hence, for renters, the maximization problem can be written in terms of the total
consumption expenditure, ĉt and the non-durable and housing expenditure can be
determined by eqs. 1.25 and 1.26:
V rrt (mt, y
p
t , pt) = max
ĉt
u (c̃t) + β
{y,p}
Et{V rt+1(mt+1, ypt+1, pt+1)}
s.t.
at = mt − ĉt ≥ 0
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1
rh:
The intertemporal optimization problem for (rh), in Bellman form, is given by
V rht (mt, y
p
t , pt) = max
ĉt,ht,bt
u (c̃t) + β
{y,p}
Et{V ht+1(mt+1, ht+1, bt+1, ypt+1, pt+1)}
s.t.
at = mt − ĉt − [ptht − bt] ≥ 0
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1
ht+1 = ht
bt ≤ ηLTV .pt.ht
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λt+1(bt+1) ≤ ηPTI .ypt
bt+1 = (1 + r
m)bt





= αα(1− α)1−αu′ (c̃t+1) . (1.28)
1.9.1.3 Homeowner’s problem
There are 3 sub-types of homeowners: (hh), (ht), and (hd).
hh
The intertemporal optimization problem for (hh), in Bellman form, is given by
V hht (mt, ht, bt, y
p




Et{V ht+1(mt+1, ht+1, bt+1, ypt+1, pt+1)}
s.t.
at = mt − ct − λ(bt) ≥ 0





bt = bt − λ(bt)




The intertemporal optimization problem for (ht), in Bellman form, is given by
V htt (mt, ht, bt, y
p






at = mt − ct + [ptht − bt] ≥ 0
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1
st = ζht
hd:
The intertemporal optimization problem for (hd), in Bellman form, is given by
V hdt (mt, ht, bt, y
p








at = mt − ct ≥ 0
mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1
st = ζht
The homeowners’ problem yields:








1.9.1.4 Tenant and Defaulter’s problem
Since the tenant or defaulter always remains a tenant or defaulter, respectively,
V t,dt = V
tt,dd
t . Their intertemporal optimization problem, in Bellman form, is sim-
ilar and is given by
V t,dt (mt, y
p
t ) = max
ĉt




at = mt − ĉt ≥ 0
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mt+1 = (1 + r)at + yt+1





= αα(1− α)1−αu′ (c̃t+1) (1.30)
1.9.1.5 Consumption functions of sub-types
Tenant and Defaulter:





t ) = β
{y}
Et{V t,dt+1((1 + r)at + yt+1, ypt+1)} (1.31)
that returns the expected t+1 value for the tenant or defaulter associated with ending
period t with assets at, having received persistent income y
p
t .
The non-housing consumption function for a tenant or defaulter is then given by:
ct(at, y
p












It is possible to define a function
vrt (at, y
p
t , pt) = β
{y,p}
Et{V rt+1((1 + r)at + yt+1, ypt+1, pt+1)} (1.33)
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that returns the expected t+1 value for a household ending period t as a renter with
assets at, having received persistent income y
p
t , and house price shock pt.
The non-housing consumption function for rr is given by:
ct(at, y
p









It is possible to define a function
vht (at, ht, bt, y
p
t , pt) = β
{y,p}
Et{V ht+1((1 + r)at + yt+1, ht+1(ht), bt+1(bt), ypt+1, pt+1)}
(1.35)
that returns the expected t+1 value for a household ending period t as a homeowner
with assets, at, housing stock, ht, mortgage balance, bt, having received persistent
income ypt , and house price shock pt.
The non-housing consumption function for rh is given by:
ct(at, ht, bt, y
p
t , pt) = α
(








The non-housing consumption function for hh is given by:
ct(at, ht, bt, y
p
t , pt) =
(











where ̺ = αα−αρ−1(1− α)(1−α)(1−ρ).
(ht, hd)
The non-housing consumption function for ht or hd is given by:
ct(at, ht(ht), bt(bt), y
p









1.9.1.6 The method of endogenous gridpoints
Denote by −→at the grid of end-of-period assets (greater than their lower bound). Each
element i of the grid is denoted by at,i. Similarly, a grid is set over persistent income
(
−→
ypt ), transitory income (
−→
θt ), house prices (
−→pt ), housing (
−→
ht), and mortgage debt (
−→
bt ).
Each {at,i,ypt,j} pair is associated with some marginal valuation as of the end of
period t for tenants, and defaulters, i.e. vt,d′t (at,i, y
p
t,j). Each {at,i,ypt,j, pt,k} pair is
associated with some marginal valuation as of the end of period t for renters, i.e.
vr′t (at,i, y
p
t,j, pt,k). Similarly, each {at,i,ht,j,bt,k,ypt,l,pt,m} pair is associated with some
marginal valuation as of the end-of-period t for homeowners, i.e. vh′t (at,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m).
Using the expressions for the end-of-period consumption functions solved above, it is
then trivial to solve for the value of cs that yields the appropriate marginal valuation
for the 7 sub-types of households, s.
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With mutually consistent values of cst,{i,j} and {at,i, ypt,j} for s ∈ {tt, dd}, we can
find the mt,{i,j} that corresponds to them. The
−→mt gridpoints are endogenous and we
can generate a set of mt,{i,j} and c
s
t,{i,j} pairs that can be interpolated in order to yield
the consumption interpolation function cs(−→mt,
−→
ypt ).
For s ∈ {rr}, with mutually consistent values of cst,{i,j,k} and {at,i, ypt,j, pt,k}, we
can find the mt,{i,j,k} that corresponds to them. This results in the consumption
function for continuing renters, given by crr(−→mt,
−→
ypt ,
−→pt ). For s ∈ {rh}, with mutually
consistent values of crht,{i,j,k,l,m} and {at,i, ht,j, bt,k, ypt,l, pt,m}, we can find the mt,{i,j,k,l,m}
that corresponds to them. crh(−→mt,
−→
ypt ,
−→pt ) then is the consumption function that forms
an upper-envelope over the different {ht,j,bt,k} pairs.
Similarly, with mutually consistent values of chht,{i,j,k,l,m} and {at,i, ht,j, bt,k, ypt,l, pt,m},
we can find {mt,{i,j,k,l,m}, ht,{i,j,k,l,m}, bt,{i,j,k,l,m}} that correspond to them. This results








Finally, for households ceasing to be homeowners, s ∈ {ht, hd}, with mutually con-
sistent values of cst,{i,j,k,l,m} and {at,i, ht,j(ht,j), bt,k(bt,k), ypt,l, pt,m}, we can find the
mt,{i,j,k,l,m} that corresponds to them. Note that in this case, the exogenous grid


















































































t (at,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m) + λ(bt,k(bt,k)) + κm hh
at,i + c
ht
t (at,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m)− [pt,mht,j − bt,k] + κs ht
at,i + c
hd









1.9.1.7 Conditional value functions of sub-types
Each of the gridpoint pairs are also associated with some valuation as of the end






t,j, pt,k), and v
h
t (at,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m). Given
the consumption functions, we can also calculate the conditional value functions vt.
Denoting the {ht,bt} pair associated with the upper-envelope for the rh problem by









+ vt,dt (at,i, y
p











+ vrt (at,i, y
p
t,j, pt,k) s = rr
vst (mt,i, y
p






+ vht (at,i,ht,j,bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m) s = rh
vst (mt,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m) = u
(




+vht (at,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m) s = hh
vst (mt,i, ht,j, bt,k, y
p
t,l, pt,m) = u
(






t,l) s = ht








− χ+ vdt (at,i, ypt,l) s = hd




1.9.1.8 Period-T solution and T-1 adjustment
For faster convergence of the solution, we use the converged tenant’s solution as
the terminal period T’s solution. Denote the converged consumption function as
ct∞(mt, y
p




t ). Since we are using the
converged tenant’s solution as the period T solution for all types of households, we
have to make an adjustment to the liquid assets of households who are homeowners
at the end of period T-1 to compensate them for the house that will be revoked
from them. One way of making this compensation is by giving them funds that are
equivalent to the home equity they would have had at the beginning of period T. This
adjustment is made between the end of period T-1 and the beginning of period T.
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The T-1 problem for rh is given by:
V rhT−1(mT−1, y
p
T−1, pT−1) = max
cT−1,sT−1,hT−1,bT−1














aT−1 = mT−1 − cT−1 − sT−1 − [pT−1.hT−1 − bT−1]− κp, aT−1 ≥ 0
mT = R.aT−1 + yT + [pT .hT − bT ]
hT = hT−1
bT−1 ≤ ηLTV .pT−1.hT−1
bT = R
m.bT−1
The T-1 problem for hh is given by:
V hhT−1(mT−1, hT−1, bT−1, y
p
T−1, pT−1) = maxcT−1














aT−1 = mT−1 − cT−1 − λT−1(bT−1)− κm, aT−1 ≥ 0




bT−1 = bT−1 − λT−1(bT−1)
bT = R
m.bT−1
1.9.2 Perfect Foresight Solution and Method for
Extrapolation
1.9.2.1 Tenant’s perfect foresight consumption function
I solve for the perfect foresight solution of the tenant’s problem without a liquidity
constraint. The intertemporal optimization problem for (tt), in Bellman form, is
given by
V tt (mt, y
p
t ) = max
ĉt




at = mt − ĉt
mt+1 = Rat + yt+1
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The Euler equation for this problem is given by







With perfect foresight and CRRA utility, this becomes
ĉt









Then, the present discounted value of total consumption is given by







= ĉt + ♣R ĉt + ♣R
2 ĉt + ...
(1.44)







The lifetime human wealth of the perfect foresight household, ht, is given by






From the intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) we have that,
PDV (ĉt) = PDV (yt) +mt − yt
= PDV (y) +mt − y









ĉt = ht +mt − y
This gives the perfect foresight consumption function for the tenant,
ct(mt) = ακt
(
ht + (mt − y)
)
, (1.48)

































































Applying the u−1(.) operator to this yields:













1.9.3 Transformation for extrapolation
In the EGM, we need to evaluate the gothic-v values for all points on the a-grid.
For most of the points on the a-grid interpolation is used; however, for high values
of a-grid, extrapolation might be needed. There are two problems involved with
extrapolation at high values of a-grid that need to be addressed. Firstly, extrapola-
tion at the highest values of a-grid can possibly lead to inaccurate results. Secondly,
certain multi-dimensional interpolators do not extrapolate. In order to avoid these
problems, I will transform the consumption and value functions in a way that allows
us to get as close as possible to the true solution at large values of mt.
In our model, at very high values of liquid assets, mt, renters choose to stay
as renters and homeowners choose to sell their house and become tenants. This is
because homeowners only have access to single sized house and at very high values of
mt that house does not provide enough housing services. In contrast to homeowners,
renters and tenants can adjust their housing services freely without an upper-bound on
the rental services. I use this feature of the model and the fact that the consumption
functions are bounded above by the perfection foresight solution to extrapolate a
transformed consumption function.
For clarity, I will suppress all the arguments of the consumption functions except
for mt. Denote the consumption function from the optimization problem by ct(mt)






























Calling the interpolated version
−→̃







1.9.4 Geometric mortgage payments
I assume a geometric mortgage payment schedule in which each period’s mortgage
payment, πt, is a fixed proportion ρ of the mortgage balance at the beginning of the
period, i.e.
πt = ρ.bt (1.49)
Mortgage balance evolves according to
bt+1 = (bt − πt).(1 + rm). (1.50)
We need to determine the value of ρ such that the half-life of the mortgage balance





where n = 15 at an annual frequency and n = 60 at a quarterly frequency.
We first substitute eq.(1.49) into eq.(1.50), which yields




= (1− ρ).(1 + rm) (1.52)
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Figure 1.8: Geometric mortgage payment schedule with a half-life of 15 years.
Substituting eq.(1.51) into eq.(1.53), we get




This expression does not depend on the time since mortgage origination, which means
that we do not need an extra state variable that tracks the age of the mortgage. As
can be seen in Figure1, the mortgage balance has a half life of 15-years and unlike
constant amortization, the annual mortgage payments decline with time.
1.9.5 Computation
If certain conditions are satisfied White (2015), the Endogenous Gridpoint Method
(EGM) can be used to solve a variety of models in the consumption-savings class of
models. Standard solution techniques rely on numerical root-finding methods which
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can be computationally intense. The EGM defines the problem in terms of pre- and
post-decision state variables – a technique that is used extensively in the Operations
Research literature 4– and bypasses the computationally intense root-finding step al-
together. In models with both discrete and continuous choice variables, however,
there are discontinuities in the marginal value functions in the regions in the state
space where discrete choices are made. The discontinuities in the marginal value func-
tions translate to discontinuities in the consumption functions and consequently the
EGM can produce suboptimal solution points. Identifying these suboptimal points
imposes another computational challenge (Iskhakov et al. (2017)).
If the problem being solved is an infinite-horizon problem, the computational
challenges arising from the discontinuities can become even more troubling. In a
standard consumption-saving model with a single discrete choice, each period’s solu-
tion has kinks in its value functions and discontinuities in its consumption functions
at the points around which different discrete choices are made. These are the pri-
mary kinks or discontinuities. When we iterate backwards and solve for the previous
period, not only does the solution have primary kinks from the discrete choices in
that period, the solution also has secondary kinks due to the kinks that exist in the
solution of the next period. These kinks reverberate back through each period and
the further back we iterate, the more kinks we get in our solution. This can lead to
severe problems in an infinite-horizon problem, as convergence can become virtually





To make using EGM feasible in a discrete-continuous choice model, we need to add
‘smoothness’ to the problem to reduce the severity of the kinks and the discontinuities.
Iskhakov et al. (2017) use exogenous taste shocks to achieve smoothness around the
kinks and in our model we use the endogenous search mechanism that is outlined
in the text. It must be noted that the smoothness does not remove the primary
kink/discontinuity from the period in which the decision is being made. It simply
smoothes out the discontinuities in the expected marginal value functions that are







A common perception among many academics and policymakers is that monetary
policy in advanced economies has been less effective since the crisis because of higher
household debt, and associated credit constraints. Amir Sufi summarized this view
in 2015 (Sufi (2015)): “Monetary policy over the past seven years has been ineffective
because it has channeled interest savings and additional credit to exactly the house-
holds that are least likely to change their spending in response. The households that
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would normally spend most aggressively out of monetary policy shocks are heavily
indebted or have seen their credit scores plummet, rendering them either unwilling
or unable to boost spending.”
To date, however, the issue has – to our knowledge – not been systematically
assessed. While a few studies have examined the role of household balance sheets
in monetary transmission, they have focused on the pre-crisis period, and have not
directly analyzed whether post-crisis debt levels have impeded transmission1. These
studies suggest that more indebted and less liquid households react more to mone-
tary policy. The argument is that these households run into collateral and liquid-
ity constraints, which monetary policy directly affects (Aladangady (2014); Cloyne
et al. (2018); Di Maggio et al. (2017); Flodón et al. (2017), emphasize households’
cash flows; Luo (2017) focuses on households’ default risk). Using aggregate data,
Hofmann and Peersman (2017) also find a stronger impact of monetary policy in
economies with high private debt. One open question, however, is whether at very
high debt levels, effects are different. In these cases, monetary easing may do little to
alleviate credit constraints, and thus stimulate consumption (Alpanda and Zubairy
(forthcoming); Sufi (2015); Beraja et al. (2019)).2 The responsiveness of households
1Without discussing monetary policy effects, Mian et al. (2013) and Kaplan et al. (2014) find
that leverage and liquidity significantly affect household’s propensity to consume.
2Some empirical studies show adverse effects of high debt on consumption, although they do
not examine monetary policy effects (such as Alter et al. (2018); Drehmann et al. (2017); Mian
et al. (2017a);Melzer (2017); IMF (2017); Dynan (2012)). Many studies highlight the adverse effect
on aggregate demand from debt deleveraging caused by the housing crisis during the U.S. Great
Recession (such as Eggertsson and Krugman (2012); Mian and Sufi (2014); Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2011); and Eggertsson et al. (2017)).
68
CHAPTER 2.
to monetary policy may thus display an inverted U-shaped pattern, rising as debt
levels grow below a certain threshold, and declining thereafter.
In this paper we compare the transmission of monetary policy through household
consumption in the pre- and post-crisis periods, and ask whether changes therein can
be explained by the evolution of household balance sheets. To this end, we use quar-
terly household-level data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from
1996 to 2014. We first assess average changes in the responsiveness of household con-
sumption to monetary policy shocks, which we identify using exogenous instruments
drawn from high-frequency data, in the tradition of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
We employ both synthetic cohort analysis (which enable us to obtain longer times
series and derive local projections), and standard panel data methods that exploit
the full micro data set. Next, we explore the role of two household balance-sheet
variables in driving cross-sectional differences in the responses to monetary policy
shocks: indebtedness (mortgage balance relative to house value), and liquidity (liquid
assets to monthly income).3
We show that the response of household consumption to monetary policy shocks
has diminished since the global financial crisis. We also find that higher-indebted
households tend to respond more to monetary policy shocks – particularly relative to
durable consumption – in the pre- and post-crisis periods. While effects appear non-
linear, they are not U-shaped, as households with the highest indebtedness respond
3Recent papers suggest that consumption responses to monetary policy should depend on the
distribution of households’ liquidity; see Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) models (such
as Kaplan et al. (2018), Kaplan and Violante (2018), Hedlund et al. (2016), and Francisco (2018)).
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most to monetary policy shocks. This suggests that household debt did not contribute
to lessening the effects of monetary policy over time, since the distribution of debt
did not change markedly with the crisis, while its average even increased somewhat.4
Similar results hold for household liquidity. Households with lower levels of liquid
assets react more strongly to monetary policy shocks, both pre- and post-crisis. Again,
because the distribution of liquidity across households remained stable over time,
liquidity constraints cannot explain the decline in monetary policy effectiveness. The
explanation for the lower effectiveness of monetary policy must therefore lie elsewhere,
such as in the higher degree of economic uncertainty brought about by the crisis.
2.2 Hypotheses and Data
The main questions we explore in this paper are:
1. Has the response of household consumption to monetary policy shocks declined
since the global financial crisis?
2. Do households with greater indebtedness respond more strongly to monetary
policy shocks? Is there evidence of nonlinearities – in particular does the re-
sponsiveness decline after a certain threshold?
4Justiniano et al. (2015) and Yellen (2016) also suggest that debt overhang alone cannot explain
the slow recovery from the U.S. Great Recession. Also, Bernanke (2018) does not find strong
predictive powers of household balance sheets for economic conditions, although he argues that it
does not dismiss the important role of household balance sheets considering the empirical challenges
in identifying macro effects.
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3. Do households with low levels of liquid assets react more to monetary policy
shocks? And again, are non-linear effects discernable?
4. Can shifts in the distribution of household indebtedness and liquidity between
the pre- and post-crisis periods explain the observed changes in the average
response of household consumption to monetary policy?
2.2.1 Data: Variables of Interest, Sources, and Sum-
mary Statistics
We use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)5 for household-level consumption,
income, and balance-sheet data between 1996Q1 and 2014Q4. The CEX data are well
suited for our analysis for three reasons. First, the survey offers rich cross-sectional
variation, with about 7,500 households interviewed per quarter. Second, the quarterly
frequency is helpful to study the short-run effects of monetary policy on households’
consumption. Third, CEX data span a sufficiently long period to compare household
behavior before and after the crisis.
We construct measures of durable and non-durable consumption expenditures.
This is to allow for the impact of monetary policy to differ across each category of
goods since theory and empirics suggest that the marginal propensity to consume
for durable and non-durable goods are significantly different (Souleles (1999); Parker
5CEX data available at: https://www.bls.gov/cex/pumd_data.htm#stata
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et al. (2013); see Appendix 2.7.1 for more details).
We consider two key characteristics of household balance sheets: indebtedness
and liquidity. Indebtedness is defined as the ratio of each household’s total mortgage
balance (summed over all the properties owned by the household) to the value of the
houses it owns, as reported by households. We exclude other liabilities like credit
card balances, since fewer households report these and because mortgage debt is the
most significant liability for most households.6 We define liquidity as the ratio of
liquid assets to monthly income, as reported by households. Liquid assets include the
total balance on households’ checking and savings accounts, and income is after-tax.
Details are provided in Appendix 2.7.1.
Table 2.1 highlights key features of non-durable and durable consumption. On
average, households spend four times more on non-durable consumption relative
to durable consumption in any given quarter. However, the standard deviation of
durable consumption is notably larger than that of non-durable consumption, point-
ing to the lumpy nature of durable goods purchases (Caballero and Jaffe (1993)).
Consumption levels differ across housing tenure, especially for durable consumption
(see Appendix 2.7.1).7 The distribution of consumption quarter-on-quarter growth
changes little after the crisis for both durable and non-durable categories, while the
distribution of consumption levels shifts slightly to the left after the crisis.
6The CEX collects mortgage information in all interviews, while it collects other financial in-
formation (such as credit card debt) only in the 2nd and 5th interviews. Therefore, we focus on
mortgage debt, the largest component of household debt, in examining the effects of indebtedness.
7Housing tenure is a factor that has been found to be correlated with consumption decisions.





2.2.2 Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks
As typical in this literature, we face a tradeoff between overcoming endogeneity and
measuring a meaningful relationship between monetary policy and consumption. The
former pushes us to seek exogenous monetary policy shocks. However, as these tend
to be small, finding a stable and substantial effect on consumption can be difficult.
We identify monetary policy shocks using high frequency data at the time of
monetary policy announcements. We do so in the tradition of Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005), by capturing changes in asset prices closely correlated with monetary policy
expectations. However, unlike Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), we do not use futures
on Federal Fund Rates, since these remained little changed (and close to zero) during
the post-crisis period, despite repeated steps taken to loosen monetary policy, such
as through quantitative easing (QE) programs.
To find a measure that is equally suitable for pre- and post-crisis periods, we
resort to changes in 2-year bond yields, taking the cue from Gürkaynak et al. (2005),
Gürkaynak et al. (2007), and subsequently, Gilchrist et al. (2015), Ferrari et al. (2017),
and Hanson and Stein (2015), among others. The identifying assumption is that 2-
year bond yields on the day prior to a scheduled monetary policy announcement
capture market expectations of future policy interest rates, as well as perceptions of
policy uncertainty as reflected in term premia. Thus, changes in 2-year yields on
announcement days reflect the surprise component of monetary policy along both
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dimensions. We sum monetary policy surprises from all announcements in a given
quarter, as in Romer and Romer (2004), to construct measures consistent with our
quarterly data on consumption.
2.3 Has the Response of Household Con-
sumption Changed Post-Crisis?
Households are only interviewed by the CEX survey for four consecutive quarters,
and subsequently drop out of the dataset. This limits the assessment of consumption
reaction to monetary shocks to a time horizon of three quarters. Therefore, for a first
analysis of impulse responses to monetary shocks, we construct synthetic cohorts to
obtain longer time series.
Constructing synthetic cohorts amounts to categorizing households at any given
quarter according to pre-defined buckets, then linking the data between buckets to
create longer time-series. The underlying assumption is that households with similar
characteristics–belonging to the same bucket–respond similarly to monetary policy
shocks. Obviously, such an approach has its limitations, since households can differ
along many characteristics which are not controlled for.
We build cohorts using the head of household’s birth year and housing tenure. For
the grouping by birth year we define 14 groups using 5-birth year intervals, while for
the grouping by housing tenure we retain 3 groups: owners with mortgage, owners
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without mortgage, and renters. As a result, we build 42 representative consumer units
with data for the whole sample period. More details on the construction of synthetic
cohort panel data are provided in Appendix 2.7.2.
We then use the panel of synthetic cohorts to estimate the response of durable-
and non-durable consumption to monetary policy, estimating the impulse response










1 2yrt + β
(h)
2 postGFC + β
(h)
3 postGFC ∗ 2yrt
+ β
(h)
4 Xj,t + β
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is the cumulative log change in real consumption by the synthetic
cohort j between periods t and t+ h, 2yrt is the 2-year yield, Xj,t is a cohort-specific
vector of controls that includes age and age squared, St is a set of macro controls that
includes inflation, GDP growth rate, and quarterly dummies, and h = 1, ..., 12.
To test the hypothesis that the effect of monetary policy has changed after the
GFC, we include a dummy variable, labeled postGFC in the above equation, for the
post-crisis period (2009Q1 and onwards) and interact it with the policy rate. The
coefficients β
(h)
1 captures the pre-GFC effect of monetary policy and β
(h)
3 captures
the additional effect of monetary policy added in the post-GFC. These consump-
tion responses to a contractionary monetary policy are expected to be persistently
negative.11
11Previous studies show that a contractionary monetary policy would generate a hump-shaped
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We instrument the 2-year yield (2yrt) to address endogeneity–the possibility that
bond yields reflect monetary policy responses to changes in consumption. As in-
struments, we adopt exogenous monetary policy shocks from high-frequency data, as
discussed earlier. We exploit overidentification to overcome weak instrument bias by
using the contemporaneous monetary policy shock and its lags as the instruments. We
use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to obtain more precise estimates.1213
Turning to the results, Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and plot the GMM estimates for
1996Q1-2014Q4. The dependent variable is the accumulated quarterly growth rate
in real consumption. Individual data from CEX are aggregated in 42 synthetic co-
horts according to housing status and 5-year birth year intervals. In the first stage
regression, the 2-year yield is instrumented by monetary policy shocks. All regres-
sions include a constant, aggregate macroeconomic controls (inflation and real GDP
growth), and quarterly seasonal effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. The full line shows the estimated effect, while the dotted
lines show the 90 percent confidence interval. The results show that the pre-GFC ef-
fect of monetary policy measured by β
(h)
1 is negative on both durable and non-durable
consumption growth, while the additional effect due to the post GFC β
(h)
3 is positive
drop in consumption and investment in the data (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum (2005); Cloyne
et al. (2018); and Wong (2015)), which could be explained by various frictions (e.g., see Christiano
et al. (2010), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), and Alpanda and Zubairy (forthcoming)). These con-
sumption responses to monetary policy are related but different from the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (e.g., see Kaplan et al. (2018)). For a survey of the estimation of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, see Thimme (2016).
12See Ramey (2016) and Stock and Watson (2018).
13We also experimented using more than one type of monetary policy shock. Results are robust





We follow the same procedure as before in instrumenting 2-year yields (2yrt) using
high-frequency monetary policy shocks and their lags as instruments to overcome weak
instrument bias, and using GMM estimation.
The results confirm the earlier findings of a weaker impact of monetary policy after
the crisis. Overall, we find the expected response of both durable and non-durable
consumption to monetary policy shocks. In the pre-crisis period, an expansionary
monetary policy shock (a 10-basis point reduction in the 2-year yield) increases non-
durable and durable consumption by about 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively
(Table 2.4, columns 3 and 4). In the post-crisis period, the response of durable- and
non-durable consumption to monetary policy is clearly weaker (as seen by positive
and significant values of β2). For durable consumption, the effect is only marginally
statistically significant (Table 2.4, columns 4 and 6).16
Household-level controls have a significant and expected impact on households’
non-durable consumption. College-educated, white, married, and older households
display higher consumption growth following looser monetary policy. However, these
characteristics are not found to be important determinants of durable consumption.
When we estimate equation (2.2) over the full sample, by removing the post-GFC
dummy and its interaction with monetary policy, results show that expansionary mon-
etary policy boosts both durable and non-durable consumption, as expected (Figure
2.3 and Table 2.4, column 1 and 2). The estimated effect is stronger for nondurables;
16Our main results are robust to adding income change as an additional control variable (Table





2.4 Does Household Indebtedness Matter?
In this section we ask whether household indebtedness affects the response of con-
sumption to monetary policy impulses. Next, we explore the role of non-linearities,
and ask whether the change in the distribution of household indebtedness post-crisis
might help explain the lower monetary policy impact on consumption detected earlier.






=β0 + β12yrt + β2(LTVi,t−1.2yrt) + β3LTVi,t−1
+ β4Zi,t + λs(t) + ui,t
(2.3)
As earlier, the model is estimated using GMM, where the 2-year yield is instru-
mented by monetary policy shocks. A negative value of β2 supports the hypothesis
that households with higher indebtedness respond more to monetary policy shocks.
However, the total effect of monetary policy loosening on consumption growth must
be read from β1 + β2 ∗ LTV .
The results show that β2 has a negative sign, in line with the notion of a higher
responsiveness of more indebted households. The estimated coefficient is, however,
only significant for durable consumption. To understand further whether and how
the responsiveness of consumption to monetary policy shocks varies with household
indebtedness, we check for the joint significance of β1 and β2 along the spectrum of






To study whether consumption growth responds non-linearly to household indebt-






=β0 + β12yrt + β2(ILTV <0.9.2yrt) + β3ILTV <0.9
+ β4Zi,t + λs(t) + ui,t
(2.4)
where ILTV <0.9 is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 when indebtedness
is less than the 90th percentile over the sample period 1996Q1–2014Q4. Therefore,
a significant value of β2 implies that transmission is different across households with
high and low indebtedness. We find that higher indebtedness increases responsiveness
to monetary policy shocks for non-durable consumption over the full and pre-crisis
samples (Table 2.5, columns 3 and 5, respectively). Thus, effects of indebtedness
appear to be non-linear. The results for durable consumption are comparable over
the pre-crisis sample (Table 2.5, column 6), and have the expected sign though are
not significant for the full sample (Table 2.5, column 4).
We further explore the responsiveness of consumption at other thresholds, namely
at 70, 80, 95, and 99th percentiles. Results corroborate the above findings: the re-
sponse to monetary policy shocks increases with indebtedness, but there is no evidence
19Moreover, as discussed in Alpanda and Zubairy (forthcoming) high levels of debt may dampen
the eectiveness of monetary policy because highly indebted households may be less willing, or less
able, to borrow further in response to a rate cut, especially during recessionary periods when agents
are facing higher job insecurity and income uncertainty. After a shock, households may need to re-
build wealth and increase precautionary savings (Mian and Sufi (2014), Carroll and Kimball (1996)).
A more specific channel refers to the mechanism by which under-the-water-households may not invest





responsiveness of non-durable and durable consumption to a 10-basis-point rise in the
2-year yield is found to increase by 2 and 4 basis points, respectively, due to shift in
the distribution of household indebtedness post-crisis. The proportion of households
in the top 10 percentile of LTV distribution grew from 5 percent before crisis to 8
percent in the post-crisis period. According to equation 2.4, this implies a 3- and
6-basis-point increase in the responsiveness of non-durable and durable consumption,
respectively, to a 10-basis-point hike in the 2-year yield. Thus, both specifications
indicate that changes in the LTV distribution have per se contributed to a higher
responsiveness of consumption to monetary policy in the post-crisis period. We must
therefore look elsewhere to seek a plausible explanation for the drop in monetary
policy effectiveness relative to consumption.
2.5 Does Household Liquidity Matter?
We proceed in much the same way as in the earlier section. We ask whether the
liquidity position of households affects their consumption response to monetary policy
impulses. We further ask whether there are non-linearities, and whether the change
in the distribution of household liquidity post-crisis might help explain the lower
monetary policy impact on consumption detected earlier in this paper.








=β0 + β12yrt + β2(LIQi,t−1.2yrt) + β3LIQi,t−1
+ β4Zi,t + λs(t) + ui,t
(2.5)
In this specification, a positive value of β2 supports the hypothesis that households
with low liquidity respond more to monetary policy shocks.
Estimates of β2 are however found to be insignificant (Table 2.7, columns 1 and 2).
To investigate the issue further, we examine whether the responsiveness of consump-
tion to monetary policy shocks varies with liquidity levels. For this purpose, we check
for the joint significance of β1 and β2 along the spectrum of liquidity values (Figure
2.6). The results show that the responsiveness of non-durable consumption is only sig-
nificant at relatively low liquidity values (with liquid-assets-to-monthly income ratios
of up to around one).
We explore the possibility that only households with liquidity below a certain
threshold respond more to interest rate shocks in a nonlinear setting. Specifically, we






=β0 + β12yrt + β2(ILIQ>.25.2yrt) + β3ILIQ>.25
+ β4Zi,t + λs(t) + ui,t
(2.6)
where ILIQ>.25 is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 when a household’s




The results indicate that non-durable consumption responds most strongly when
households are liquidity constrained. We find qualitatively similar, but not statisti-
cally significant results for durable consumption (Table 2.7, column 3 and 4).21 Table
2.8 offers an interpretation of results, listing the extent of the consumption response
to a 10-basis point surprise hike in the 2-year interest rate. The response of non-
durable consumption increases monotonically as liquidity is lowered from the 20th to
the 10th and 5th percentiles. In the first case, consumption of non-durables rises by
2.3 percentage points, while in the last it increases by 2.5 percentage points–not an
innocuous difference.
Overall, our results provide some support for the findings of Kaplan and Violante
(2014) that non-durable consumption of wealthy hand-to-mouth households (namely
those with limited liquid assets) responds more strongly to interest rate changes.
Lastly, we ask whether the change in the distribution of liquidity from pre- to post-
crisis times might help explain the decline in monetary policy effects on consumption.
For liquidity to be relevant, the distribution should have moved rightward, toward a
lower share of liquidity constrained and highly responsive households.
However, the distribution of liquidity has hardly changed over time, or, if anything,
has shifted to the left (Figure 2.7). Based on coefficient estimates from equation 5,
the responsiveness of non-durable consumption is found to marginally strengthen
after the crisis due to the observed shift in the liquidity distribution (a 10-basis-point
21As in the case of leverage, we also estimated equation 6 for durable consumption for the pre-
crisis period. Liquidity continues to not matter for transmission of monetary policy to durable






therefore lie elsewhere, such as in the higher degree of economic uncertainty brought
about by the crisis.22
2.6 Conclusion
We find that the average responsiveness of U.S. household consumption to well-
identified monetary policy shocks has declined since the global financial crisis. How-
ever, this result cannot be explained by higher indebtedness or lower liquidity levels.
Households with higher debt levels and lower shares of liquid assets are the most
responsive to monetary policy, and the share of these households in the population
grew. The common notion that a deterioration of household balance sheets after the
crisis hampered monetary policy effectiveness is not validated in the data.
Nevertheless, household balance sheets do matter for the strength of monetary pol-
icy transmission, and our results underscore the notion that monetary policy makers
need to pay close attention to them. Moreover, given the presence of nonlinearities
(the responsiveness of more indebted households rises non-linearly with indebtedness),
monitoring the distribution of household balance sheet characteristics is important.
22Aastveit et al. (2017) find that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect economic activity less when
uncertainty is high, in line with “real-option” effects from theory (e.g., Bloom (2009)). While not
reported here, we explored whether the higher uncertainty in the post-crisis period accounts for the
lower effectiveness of monetary policy, by interacting monetary policy shocks in our estimation with
the index of economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker et al. (2016). While this preliminary






The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is a survey conducted by the Census Bu-
reau and is primarily used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine the weights
assigned to different goods and services in calculating the consumer price index (CPI).
The CEX is a rotating panel survey and each household is interviewed once per every
three months for, at most, 15 consecutive months. In addition, the survey sample is
designed to be representative of the U.S. civilian non-institutional population.
2.7.1.1 Data cleanup
We take several steps to clean up the raw CEX data. We drop observations in which
the CEX records negative consumption for households. We also drop observations for
households with more than one consumption unit and households with less than four
interview observations. This cleanup results in roughly 5,000 quarterly household
observations, of which 74 percent are homeowners and 45 percent are homeowners
with outstanding mortgage balance. On average, households spend $4,320 on non-
durable goods and $1,048 on durable goods. Some summary statistics for housing
tenure and consumption for the data are shown in Appendix I Table 2.9 below.




Appendix I Table 1 outlines the CEX variables used to construct non-durable and
durable consumption variables.
Details of the CEX variables used in constructing non-durable and durable con-
sumption variables are mentioned in Appendix I Table 2.10.
2.7.1.3 Leverage and Liquidity
Most of the household balance sheet data are only available in the 5th interview, while
mortgage information is asked in every interview. Leverage is proxied by the ratio of
mortgage balance to the reported house value. We aggregate the mortgage balances
reported on all the properties owned by the household. The CEX variables used
for constructing this are QBLNCM1X or QBLNCM2X, which report the household’s
mortgage balance at the beginning of the month, three months prior to the interview
or two months prior to the interview, respectively. Our choice over which of the
two variables to use depends on which month corresponds to the first month in the
consumption quarter. If a household refinances its mortgage on a property, we adjust
the household’s mortgage balance such that the mortgage balances before and after
refinancing are not double-counted. For property value we use PROPVALX. We
construct a house price index using this variable and it matches well with the Case-
Shiller Home Price Index, particularly the boom-bust in the house prices although it
is not shown here.
Liquid assets include the total balance a household has in their checking and sav-
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ings accounts. From 2013 onwards, liquid assets also include money market accounts
and certificates of deposits. The CEX variables used in constructing the liquid assets
variable are LIQUIDX for the period covering 2013–14 and CKBKACTX + SAVAC-
CTX for 1994–2012. Unlike balance-sheet variables, income is reported in both the
second and the fifth interview. We use the imputed after-tax income, FINCATXM
from 2004 onwards. For the prior years, we use the reported after-tax income, FIN-
CATAX, and replace invalid missing entries with imputed income data. Appendix
Table 2.11 shows the correlation matrix among key variables.
2.7.1.4 Cohorts and control variables
We construct the synthetic cohorts using housing tenure (CUTENURE) and the
household head’s birth year, which is determined by the interview date and the
household head’s age (AGE REF) at the time of the interview. The control vari-
ables used in the panel analysis include race (REF RACE), education (EDUC REF),
age (AGE REF), family size (FAM SIZE), and marital status (MARITAL1).
2.7.2 Synthetic Cohort Panel Data
2.7.2.1 Construction of Synthetic Cohort Panel
To measure the responsiveness of households’ consumption to monetary policy over





of CUs in a synthetic cohort varies across cohorts. This variation in the number of CUs
in synthetic cohorts can be problematic. The time-series data of synthetic cohorts
with few CUs tend to be much volatile than that of synthetic cohorts with many CUs,
because household-specific changes in consumption are not averaged out. This leads
to high standard errors for synthetic cohorts with few CUs. Also, if the time-series
of consumption and income are too short, estimation may suffer from a small sample
bias.
2.7.2.2 Estimation of Cohort-Level Variablesl
Given the definition of synthetic cohorts, we estimate durable and non-durable con-
sumption paths for each cohort. We consider a reduced form relationship between
cohort-level consumption and individual household-level consumption in the cohort
as follows:
log(cj,i,t) = log(ci,t) + εj,i,t,
where εj,i,t ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2i,t)
where cj,i,t is consumption level of household j in cohort i at time t, ci,t is cohort-
level consumption for cohort i at time t, and εj,i,t is a household-specific idiosyncratic
shock at time t, which has mean zero and variance σ2i,t. That is, we model log of




In this reduced form model, the simple average of log(cj,i,t) over households in
cohort i at time t is a consistent estimate of log(ci,t) by the law of large numbers.
Since the CEX is a random sample from U.S. population, we use the CEX sample
weights in taking the average. We interpret the CEX sample weights as the number
of off-sample households who are represented by the consumer unit in the sample.
Namely, we consider that there are ωj,i,t households who are similar to household i,
and hence whose consumptions are equal to cj,i,t. Therefore, our estimate of cohort-
level logged consumption is the weighted average of logged consumption expenditures








where Ii,t is the set of households in cohort i at time t, ωj,i,t is the CEX sample






Search Smooths Discontinuities in
Discrete/Continuous Problems
3.1 Introduction
This paper introduces new methods for efficiently solving dynamic optimization prob-
lems with both discrete and continuous choices (DC models). These methods extend
the Endogenous Gridpoint Method (EGM) (Carroll (2006)) by including exogenous
outcome probabilities, search frictions, and taste shocks to ‘concavify ’ the value func-
tion of the optimization problem. Compared to existing extensions of the EGM for
DC models, the methods introduced in this paper have the added advantage of not




For dynamic stochastic optimization problems with continuous choice variables,
the Endogeneous Gridpoint Method (EGM) is significantly more efficient compared
to standard root-finding methods in finding the optimal decision rules. In these prob-
lems, the value functions are typically concave and the Euler equation is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the optimal decision rule. In contrast, when the choice
variables include both continuous and discrete choices (DC models), the Euler equa-
tion has multiple solutions for the continuous choice. Therefore, the Euler equation
is only a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the optimal decision rule.
The complication in solving a dynamic optimization problem arises due to the
kinks in the value function and discontinuities in the decision rule at the points in the
state space where discrete choices are made. These discontinuities make the decision
rule non-monotonic, which leads to the Euler equation producing suboptimal points.
In addition, each period’s kinks and discontinuities are propagated back in time as
the solution is solved by backward iteration, thus, exacerbating the problem. Fella
(2014), Druedahl and Jørgensen (2017), and Iskhakov et al. (2017) provide methods
for finding and discarding these suboptimal points from the final solution.
In order to mitigate the complications arising from the accumulation of the dis-
continuities, Iskhakov et al. (2017) introduce Extreme Value Type I taste shocks that
affect the likelihood of the discrete choice outcomes. These taste shocks have the
advantage of smoothing out the expected value function and the expected marginal
utility function. With larger taste shocks, the value function can be ‘concavified’ to
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a greater degree. Such taste shocks, however, are in fact ‘behavioral’ shocks that add
a degree of randomization to the discrete choice outcomes.
In contrast, this paper introduces search frictions whereby agents exert search
effort that determines the likelihood of changing the discrete state. In addition, it
includes log-normally distributed taste shocks that affect the utility that agents derive
from making discrete choices. Combined, these two features not only lead to greater
smoothness of the decision rule, they also rationalize the smoothness arising from the
taste shocks, as these shocks determine the search effort that the agents exert.
To illustrate the properties of search as a smoothing mechanism and to compare
it to other modeling features that can also provide smoothness, we use a standard
consumption-saving model in which the agent can also receive the ‘option’ to make a
binary retirement decision, depending on the search effort that they make. If the agent
makes no search effort, they receive the option to retire with exogenous probability p
and if they make the maximum effort, they receive the option to retire with certainty.
Effort, however, is costly and the cost function is assumed to be a convex function of
effort. In addition, households receive taste shocks that affect the relative value they
derive from working and are also exposed to income uncertainty.
All four of the aforementioned modeling features, i.e. search, exogenous switching
probability, taste shocks, and income shocks, serve to smooth out the decision rule
in the DC model with varying degrees of effectiveness. While search provides the
highest degree of smoothness, in terms of reducing the size of the discontinuities in
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the decision rule, it has to be combined with taste shocks to yield uniform smoothness
around the discontinuities. Moreover, each of the smoothing mechanisms have differ-
ent economic interpretations and affect the decision rules differently. While greater
smoothness from search and exogenous switching probability shifts the consumption
function upwards, greater smoothness from taste shocks and income shocks shifts the
consumption function downwards.
3.2 Model
In this section, we build a consumption-saving model and extend it to include the op-
tion to retire and search frictions. Agents in this model derive utility from consuming
non-durable goods ct and get disutility from working. The disutility parameter is de-
noted by δ. Each period, there is a possibility for the agents to receive an ‘option’ to
retire. The likelihood of receiving the option depends on the amount of search effort
εt−1 that the agent exerted in the previous period. Search effort, however, is costly
and we assume that the search cost is a convex function of effort, with a functional
form given by θ(εt) = σ
s (εt + (1− εt) log (1− εt)). This cost function implies that
the initial marginal effort is cheap; however, greater effort that increases the likeli-
hood of receiving the option to switch the discrete state leads to increasingly larger
costs. Assuming logarithmic utility from consumption, and denoting the choice to
retire and the choice to work by dt = 0 and dt = 1, respectively, the utility function
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for the agent is given by
u(ct, dt, εt) = log(ct)− δdt − θ(εt). (3.1)
At the end of each period, households can save their end-of-period liquid assets At
at a risk free rate R. Working in the current period determines whether the agent
receives income yt in the following period. Therefore, the beginning-of-period assets
are given by Mt = RAt + ytdt−1. Furthermore, we assume that yt = yηt, where ηt




Retirement is assumed to be self-absorbing, so the problem reduces to the simple
consumption-saving problem, which in Bellman form is given by:
V Rett (Mt) = max
0≤ct≤Mt
{u(ct, 0, 0) + βV Rett+1 (Mt+1)}, (3.2)
whereMt+1 = AtR and the end-of-period assets At =Mt−ct. Using the gothic script
V (V) to represent the value of ending the period with assets At, the end-of-period
value for a retired agent is, by definition
VRett (At) ≡ V Rett+1 (Mt+1(At)) = V Rett+1 (AtR) (3.3)
Thus, the problem in terms of the end-of-period assets can be restated as
VRett−1(At−1) = max
0≤ct≤At−1R




Each period, a worker either receives the option to retire or has to continue working.
There is an exogenous probability p of receiving the option to retire. In addition, a
worker can increase the likelihood of receiving the option to retire by exerting search
effort. The search effort is made at the end of a period and affects the likelihood
of receiving the option to retire in the following period. When period t starts, an
income shock is realized. This is followed by the realization of a taste shock, ξt,
which is a multiplicative shock that affects the utility that a worker derives from
working. The taste shocks are assumed to follow a mean-one log-normal distribution,
i.e. ξt ∼ N (−σ2ξ
/
2, σ2ξ ). These taste shocks are different from the Extreme Value
Type I shocks in Iskhakov et al. (2017) in two major ways. Firstly, the assumption of
log-normal taste shocks means that these shocks can take up multiple distinct values
in the discrete approximation of the distribution. Secondly, these shocks are not the
purely behavioral shocks that randomize the discrete choice outcome. Instead, these
taste shocks affect the likelihood of the discrete outcome by determining the search
effort that the agent exerts.
Based on the search effort made in the previous period, if the agent receives the
option to switch, the agent decides whether to retire or continue working. If the agent
does not receive the option to switch, then they continue to work. Having made the









dt(Mt, ξt) ∈ {0, 1}
dt(Mt, ξt) = 1
ct(Mt, dt = 0)








Figure 3.1: Timing of shock realizations and decisions in the worker’s problem.
they stay as a retiree, because the assumption that retirement is self-absorbing. If the
agent chooses to continue working, they exert search effort, which then determines
the likelihood of receiving the option to switch in the next period. Fig.3.1 outlines the
timeline of the realization of various shocks and the decisions in the worker’s problem.







{dt = 0, dt = 1}, {dt = 1}
}
. The first element of
this set is the case when the agent has the option to switch and the second element
is the case when the agent does not have the option to switch and must continue
working. For the case when Dt = {W}, i.e. the worker does not have the option to
switch, the Bellman equation is given by:




u(ct, 1, εt) + βP1(εt)V
1





where V1t (At) is the expected value of saving At when having the option to retire in
t+ 1, P1(εt) = (1− εt)p+ εt is the probability receiving the option to retire in t+ 1,
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given the search effort εt in the current period, V
2
t (At) is the expected value of saving
At when not having the option to retire in t + 1, and P2(εt) = (1 − εt)(1 − p) is the
probability of not receiving the option to retire in t + 1, given the search effort εt in
the current period.
For the case when Dt = {R,W}, i.e. the case when the worker has the option to
switch, the Bellman equation is given by:
Vt(Mt, {R,W}, ξt) = max
dt∈{0,1}
[



















u(ct, 1, εt) + βP1(εt)V
1







The expected value of saving At when having the option to retire in t + 1, i.e.






Vt+1(Mt+1(At), {R,W}, ξt+1)dF (yt+1)dF (ξt+1), (3.8)
where Mt+1 = AtR+ dty. Similarly, the expected value of saving At when not having






Vt+1(Mt+1(At), {W}, ξt+1)dF (yt+1)dF (ξt+1). (3.9)
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3.2.3 Optimal effort and consumption functions
Since we assume that the consumption decision is made before the effort decision,
(3.5) can be split into two sequential sub-period problems and rewritten as:










u(ct, 1, εt) + βP1(εt)V
1





Thus, the first order condition of (3.11) gives the optimal effort as a function of the
end-of-period assets that are determined after the optimal consumption decision has










− σs log(1− ε∗t ) = β(1− p)V1t (At)− β(1− p)V2t (At) (3.13)









This expression states that optimal effort is an increasing function of the excess value
of receiving the option to switch in the next period over not receiving the option to
switch.
Next, we derives the expressions for the optimal consumption functions for the
retiree and the worker. Since retirement is self-absorbing, the retiree’s consumption
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function is relatively straightforward to derive and is given by:
u′(ct, 0, 0) = Rβu










To derive the consumption function for the worker, we start with the solution to
the problem of a worker who does not have the option to retire, i.e. Dt = {W}. The
first-order-condition for problem (3.10), with respect to ct, is given by
u′(ct, 1, ε
∗














where ε∗t is the optimal effort function, which is determined in (3.14), and the derivates






















where the expectation is over next period income and taste shocks, and V Wt+1(Mt+1, ξt+1)
and V R,Wt+1 (Mt+1, ξt+1), are shorthands for Vt+1(Mt+1, {W}, ξt+1) and Vt+1(Mt+1, {R,W}, ξt+1),
respectively. Substituting these expression into (3.17) yields
u′(ct, 1, ε
∗


















The Envelope Condition for (3.10) is given by






























To derive a similar expression for the derivative of V R,Wt+1 , we note that for the
worker who has the option to retire, i.e. Dt = {R,W}, the value function is simply
the maximum of the value function of the retiree and the value function of the worker
who continues to work







Therefore, it can be shown that
∂V R,Wt+1 (Mt+1, ξt+1)
∂Mt+1
= ✶0t+1.u






where ✶0t+1 ≡ ✶0t+1(Mt+1, ξt+1) = 1 if V Rett+1 (Mt+1) ≥ V Wt+1(Mt+1, ξt+1) and 0 otherwise,
and ✶1t+1 ≡ ✶1t+1(Mt+1, ξt+1) = 1 if V Rett+1 (Mt+1) < V Wt+1(Mt+1, ξt+1) and 0 otherwise.
Substituting (3.23) and (3.25) into (3.20) yields the consumption function for the
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worker who continues to work
u′(ct, 1, ε
∗









































































Having established the solution of the retirement problem, we demonstrate how vary-
ing the different smoothness parameters affects the solution of the problem. Fig. 3.2a
shows the optimal consumption rule of the worker who continues to work in period
T − 5, for the case in which p = 1.0. The plot shows the consumption rule for a set
of search cost scales, in the absence of income uncertainty and taste shocks. In this
scenario, there is no smoothing and the discontinuities that arise from discrete choices





To address this asymmetric smoothness, we need to introduce taste shocks. Since
the taste shocks can take a range of different values, there are certain realizations
of the taste shock that make the worker want to have the option to switch, even at
levels of liquid assets at which, in the absence of a taste shock, the worker would
not want to switch. In other words, with the introduction of taste shocks, the range
of liquid assets around the discontinuities over which the worker exerts search effort
expands. Fig.3.3a shows that with the incorporation of taste shocks, the consumption
function now smoothes out more uniformly around the discontinuities. Moreover,
introducing taste shocks allows the search frictions to significantly smooths out most
of the discontinuities in the optimal consumption function. This holds even for a very
small smoothness parameter for the taste shocks, σξ = 0.005. This is because now
there is a positive likelihood of a worker receiving a taste shock that makes them
exert search effort even for values of Mt for which the worker would not exert any
search effort in the absence of taste shocks. Increasing the magnitude of the taste
shocks to σξ = 0.02 (Fig.3.3b) significantly reduces the size of all the discontinuities
in the consumption function. Moreover, only moderately sized search frictions are
need to virtually completely smooth out the consumption function.
The results discussed so far do not include any income uncertainty. Adding in-
come uncertainty even into standard consumption-saving models adds curvature and
smoothness to the consumption rules. We study the impact of incorporating income




interpretations and affect the optimal consumption rule differently. While lower-
ing the exogenous probability of receive the option to switch, p, and increasing the
search frictions, σs, shift the consumption function upwards, large taste shocks, σξ,
and income shocks, ση, shift the consumption function downwards. Ceteris paribus,
decreasing p or increasing σs, reduce the likelihood of the worker switching their
discrete state successfully. This means that the likelihood of the worker retiring in
a given period decreases. As a result, the expected number of years that an agent
works increases and they save less in a given period. In contrast, when the size of
the taste shocks is increased, the uncertainty surrounding the likelihood of a worker’s
retirement decision increases. Consequently, the agents save more in a given period,
because unexpectedly retiring early would limit the resources that the agent can con-
sume for the remainder of their life. Similarly, when the size of the income shocks
increases, households increase their buffer stock savings, and the consumption func-
tion shifts down. Therefore, although each of the smoothness mechanisms achieve the
common goal of ‘concavifying’ the solution, they have different interpretations and
different impacts on the optimal consumption rule.
To illustrate these points graphically, we start from the baseline consumption
function that has the discontinuities completely smoothed out using smoothness pa-
rameters p = 0, σξ = 0.02, σs = 0.5, and ση =
√
0.005. Figs.3.5a shows the impact
of lowering p from the baseline level to p = 0.1 and p = 0.5, which decreases smooth-





‘upper envelope’ step is required to remove the suboptimal points. The upper enve-
lope refinement step in Iskhakov et al. (2017) is an example of an algorithm that can
be employed at the end of the EGM-step to achieve this.
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Algorithm 1: EGM-step with search for the worker who continues to work
1 Let −→η = {η1, ..., ηJ} and −→ξ = {ξ1, ..., ξK} be vectors of quadrature points with associated
weights −→ω = {ω1, ..., ωJ} and −→µ = {µ1, ..., µK}, respectively.
2 Form an ascending grid over end-of-period wealth,
−→
A t = {A1t , ..., AIt }
3 for i = 1, ..., I do
4 for j = 1, ..., J do
5 Compute M jt+1(A
i) = RAi + yηjt+1




i)) by interpolating cRett+1(
−→







i)) by interpolating cWt+1(
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9 Compute V Rett+1 (M
j
t+1(A
i)) by interpolating V Rett+1 (
−→




10 for k = 1, ...,K do
11 Compute V Wt+1(M
j
t+1(A
i), ξk) by interpolating V Wt+1(
−→
M t+1) at the point
M jt+1(A









i), ξk) = 1 if V Rett+1 (M
j
t+1(A
























16 Compute RHSpre2 (M
j
t+1(A




























i) = 1− exp
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i) + (1− εt(Ai)) log(1− εt(Ai))
)
24 Compute P1(εt(A
i)) = (1− εt(Ai)).p+ εt(Ai)
25 Compute P2(εt(A










































31 Compute value function V Wt (Mt(A




32 Compute endogenous grid point Mt(A
i) = cWt (A
i) +Ai
33 end
34 Collect the points Mt(A
i), cWt (A
i), and V Wt (Mt(A
i)) to form the consumption function,
cWt (
−→








This paper introduces search as a new method for smoothing out discrete-continuous
choice (DC) problems. While search can significantly reduce the size of the disconti-
nuities in the decision rule of a DC problem, to get uniform smoothness around the
discontinuities, we need to incorporate taste shocks as well. Together, search and
taste shocks offer modelers greater control over the degree of smoothness in DC mod-
els, while rationalizing the smoothness into the agent’s choice problem. With ample
smoothness, discontinuities in the decision rule can be smoothed out entirely; thus,
eliminating the need for incorporating an additional, computationally costly, step
of identifying and removing suboptimal points generated in the EGM step for DC
models. This paper studies search in the context of a consumption-saving-retirement
problem; however, the framework can be easily applied to models of housing purchase,
lumpy firm investments, and a wide array of other DC models.
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